Index by Editors,
INDEX.
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. See MuIuciPAL CORPORATION, 11, 12,13.
ACCEPTOR. See BILL or EXCHANGE, 1.
ACCOUNTS. See APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS, 1. EXECUTOR AND AkimIms-
TEATOR, 1, 2.
ACCURACY OF THE MEASUREMENT OF BLOOD CORPUSCLES
IN CRIMINAL CASES, 20.
ACTION.
Where a certificate of deposit, issuedby a national bank for $445, pay-
able to the order of the depositor, on the return of the certificate in cur-
rent funds, islost by the payee, and it has never been endorsed by him, he
may maintain an action at law thereon against the maker, without tender-
ing an indemnity against future liability. Citizens' National Bank v.
Brown, 392.
ACTS OF CONGRESS. See BAiTxs, 27, 32,33.
ADMINISTRATOR. See ExECu~ot AND ADXMIIMATOR.
ADMIRALTY. See Lim, 2.
A district court of the U. S. in admiralty has no jurisdiction
over petition by the owner of a steam-vessel for the trial of the ques-
tion of its Jiability for damage caused to buildings on land by fire
alleged to have been communicated to them by the vessel through sparks
from her smoke-stack, and for the limitation of such liability, if exist-
ing, under sections 4283 and 4284 of Rev. Stat. Exparts Phkamx Ins. Co., 54.
ADVANCES. See PARTNERHIP, 1.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
1. Where one purchases a lot twenty-five feet wide and erects a building
which extends several inches on the adjoining lot, and then deeds his lot
to another, describing it as twenty-five feet wide, such vendee acquires
no right to claim the benefit of the adverse possession of the vendor.
Graeven v. Devies, 344.
2. To constitute adverse possession it is not necessary that the occupation
should be such that a stranger passing the land would know that some
one was asserting title to or dominion over it; nor is it necessary that the
land be cleared or fenced, or any building be placed upon it. i1uarray
v. Hudson, 401.
3. Payment of taxes by one in possession of land under claim to title
may be admitted in evidence intending to show adverse possession. Id.
AGENT. See BANKS, 1, 4, 7, 31. ComissIoNs, 2, 3, 4. CRIMINAL LAW, 1,
2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 9. RAILROADS, 4. STOCK, 2.
1. A president of a bank who secures a settlement from an indorser on
overdue notes held by his bank, by taking new notes by the same parties,
acts as agent of the bank. Cake v. Pottsville Bank, 402.
2. One who is employed by the purchasers of goods at sheriff's sale to
dispose of the goods for them, and who deposits the proceeds of sales in
bank to his account as "trustee," using the word "trustee" because he
has another account with the bank as " agent," is only an agent, and not
a trustee as to said funds. Rowe v. Band, 537. (807)
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AGENTS-RESPONSIBILITIES OF PRINCIPALS FOR MALICIOUS
TORTS OF, 609.
ALIMONY.
A. and P. were married in West Virginia at their domicile, where A.
retained his domicile. P. went to Tennessee and there in ex parle pro-
ceedings, obtained a divorce a tincido from A., but as there was no per-
sonal service upon A., her application for alimony was dismissed without
prejudice. P. then brought suit for alimony in Ohio to reach A's prop-
erty, and served A., who appeared and pleaded. Held, P. had a right
to bring her suit for alimony alone, and a reasonable amount therefor
could be allowed out of A.'s property. Woods v. Waddle, 31.
ANIMALS.
If an animal, having no natural propensity to be vicious, commits an
injury to a person, the owner is not liable unless he had previous knowl-
edge of the vicious disposition. State v. Donahue, 769.
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS.
B. was indebted to H. individually, and also as surviving partner of H.
and G. B. made payments on account without directing their application
and H. applied them to the individual account. After H's death it was
discovered that such payments overpaid the said account. At his death
the partnership account, without the application of any of these pay-
ments, was barred. Held, That as the payments were general, and no
application was made by the debtor, the law would apply the balance
overpaid to the partnership account, as of the time when the individual
account was so overpaid, and so remove the bar. .Robie v. Brig s Estate,
543.
APPROPRLATION, OF PAYMENTS. See Sunrzy, 1.
ARREST. See PROBABLE CAUsE, 1, 2.
ARSON. See C mI=AL LAw, 10.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY. See CAuSE OF AcTroN, 1.
ASSESSMENT. See fuNcIPAL COupoRATIoNs, 11-13. STocK, 1, 2. SuB-
SCRiPTO-N, 1-3. TAXES, 3.
ASSETS. See AssiGNmENT Foit CREDxTors, 2.
Money deposited in bank to the credit of "G., guardian," is not assets
of G. in the sense that it is subject to be checked out upon G.s death by
his executor. Gary v. PeopWles at. Bank, 537.
ASSIGNMENT. See F UD'LnisT CONV-YANE, 1. TAXES, 1.
ASSIGNMENTS FOR CREDITORS. See TRUSTS, 7, 8.
1. A provision in an assignment directing a reasonable fee to be paid
to the lawyer who prepared the assignment, is not an unlawful preference.
Verner v. Davis, 471.
2. The concealment of a portion of his assets by the assignor is not suf-
ficient. alone, to justify setting aside the assignment. Id.
3. Under 13 of the Illinois Act, in relation to assignments for the
benefit of creditors, every provision in any assignment that provides for
the payment of one debt in preference to another is void; and, a against
creditors, whether resident in Illinois or a third state, attaching property
in Illinois belonging to a debtor residing in New York, such an assign-
ment, executed in New York, is void, even if by the I .ws of that state it
is valid, and although the attachment was made with actual notice of the
prior assignment. M1ay v. First .at. Bank of Attleboro, 506.
4. Where a merchant who has been conducting a successfil business for
fifteen years makes an assignment, for the benefit (f his credit,,rs, to his
own brother-in-law, after having executed chattel mortgages to his rela-
tives covering a greater part of his property, and it is shown that the
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debts set out in his schedule were contracted only a few months before
the assignment, that his stock in trade had been greatly reduced, and that
his largest creditors were his own relatives, secured by the said mortgages,
his creditors may file a bill where the assignee refuses to do so, to set aside
the chattel mortgages, compel the assignor to account for the property re-
ceived by him, and to have a receiver appointed to carry out the provi-
rions of the assignment; and when the answer and the evidence of the
defense does not overcome the presumption of fraud arising from the cir-
ciimstances shown, the creditors will be entitled to the relief prayed for.
Funke v. Cone, 402.
-ASSIGNEE. See CRF iToi' BnaL, 1.
ASSIGNOR.
Diligence required to hold assignor or guarantor, 129, 201.
ASSOCIATIONS.
Certain members of a building and saving association, who had bor-
rowed from it the full amount of" their respective stock, securing the same
by mortgages on real estate, met together, and, without authority of the
charter or constitution, and without the consent of the other members,
agreed among themselves that they would each pay up at once an amount
equal to the dues on their respective shares up to a certain date and no
more, and that their mortgages should be canceled by the association.
The then directors accepted said payments and caused the several mort-
gages to be canceled andreleased them from any furtherobligation to pay
their weekly contributions, thus practically dissolving the association.
Certain other members who had not borrowed, and did not consent to this
arrangement, sued for themselves and other members of the same class,
averring these facts and, further, that there was yet due them on their
shares a large balance. Held, (1) Even a majority could not appropriate
the funds to a purpose different from that in the charter. (2) Plaintiffs
couldsue for themselves and others of the same class. (3) Separate suits
need not be brought against each defendant. (4) Statute of limitations was
not well pleaded. (5) All delinquent stockholders should have been
brought before the court. Arling v. Kenton B. and Say. Asso., 273.
ASSUMPSIT. See PLrDGE, 1-4.
ATTACHMENT. See ASSIGNmENT FOR CRnDrrons, 3. Ia=,2. ATTo-
n AND CLrENT, 4.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. See CHAMPERTY, 1.
I. A simple inquiry made by one of an attorney as to the existence of a
matter of fact in which the inquirer is interested, does not create the rela-
tion of attorney and client so as to make their communication privileged,
and prevent the attorney from testifying with reference thereto. Piano
Afq. Co. v. Frawley, 408.
2. Where attorneys have a claim of their client for collection, and ac-
cept in payment from the debtor certain property, they have title and can
claim the property when levied on under a judgment subsequently ob-
tained bya third person. Hirsh v. Fleming, 602.
3. The plaintiff in such judgment cannot defeat their claim on the
ground that the client never authorized or ratified thetransaction. Id.
4. Where money belonging to a client is collected for him by his attor-
ney and deposited in good faith in a bank of good standing, in the name of
the attorney, such attorney is responsible for the loss thereof through fail-
ure of the bank, although the money was not mingled with his own funds,
and although the transmission of it was prevented by garnishee process soon
after its deposit, and before an opportunity to send it to the client. Naitner
v. Dolrt, 25.
5. Where, in an action for divorce and alimony, an order is made by
the court requiring a sum of money to be paid into court as and for attor-
VOL. XXXV.-102
INDEX.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
ney's fees, and afterwards the parties to the action, by collusion and fraud,
and for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff's attorney out of the al-
lowance made for his compensation, with notice of an attorney's lien
thereon in his favor, enter into an alleged settlement by which the cause
is to be dismissed and the order for alimony satisfied, such fraudulent set-
tlement will, on motion of the attorney entitled to the money, be set aside,
and the amount found due ordered to be paid into court by the defendant.
Aspinwall v. ,Sabin, 803.
ATTORNEY IN FACT. See DEED, 3.
BAILEE. See BArxns, 5, 6.
BAILMENT. See PLEDGE, TROVER AND CONVERM.ON, 1.
1. When a horse in charge of a livery-stable keeper becomes sick, it is
his duty to see that the animal has proper treatment or immediately to
notify the owner. Hexamer v. Southal, 603.
2. The owner of a livery stable is bound to exercise ordinary care over
the property intrusted to his charge, and is liable for his servants' negli-
gence. Baton v. Lancaster, 674.
BALLOTS. See EvDEN CE, 13.
BANK. See AcvoN, 1. AGENT, 1, 2. ATror= AND CLIENT, 4. BILL OF Ex-
CHANGE, 1. CAUSE or AcTION, 10. CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT, 2. CHECKS,
1-3. CREDrrope BILL, 2. DzrosrnS, 1, 3, 4. DrWDENDS,1. EVIENCE, 18,
19, 20. FRAUD, 3. Girss INTER vrvos, 2. JuRzsDicTixO, 1. PowERt
OF ATTORNEY, 1. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 2,3. PRINCIPAL AND SURE-
TY, 1. PRoMISSORY NOTE, 1. REMoVAL OF CAUSES, 1. STocx, 2.
STOCKHOLDERS, 1; 3. TAXATION, 3. TRusTs, 11, 12.
1. Where a cashier, as agent, purchases bonds for a person and receives
them as a special deposit, and to conceal his own embezzlement, enters
them as assets of the bank, his agency for the depositor ceases with the
purchase; he is the bank's agent and his knowledge of the depositor's
rights is notice to the bank; the bank is not a purchaser for value with-
out notice. Bankv. Dunbar, 121.
2. A bank with which a note is deposited by the payee for collection
cannot refuse to return the note or its proceeds to the depositor on the
ground that it was given to defraud creditors of a third person, unless the
bank itself is one of those creditors. Firat _atioal Bank of Leadville v.
Leppd, 402.
3. To bold a bank with which a note is deposited for collection as gar-
nishee with respect to his note, a special notice is necessary, specifying
the note in question as the property of a person other than the depositor.
Id. -
4. Where a bank endorses a draft for collection to another bank, and
it in turn endorses the papcr for collection to a third, and the last collects,
the collecting bank cannot apply the proceeds to a debt due it by the sec-
ond bank, that bank having become insolvent, but the proceeds belong to
the bank first endorsing, the restrictive endorsements giving notice of such
ownership to the collecting bank. It is not a question of agency. The
rights of the parties are determined by the fact that the collecting bank,
knowing from the endorsements to which bank the draft belonged, is
liable as a trustee to such owner for the proceeds. City Bank of Sherman v.
Weiss, 336.
5. A bank which holds bonds as collateral security is a bailee for re-
ward, and must exercise the same care in their safe keeping which any
reasonably prudentman exercises in the care of his own property of the
same kind; if it is a gratuitous bailee for safe keeping, it is not liable for
loss unless it has been guilty of gross carelessness. Prather v. Kean, 92.
6. It is gross negligence in a bank, when it discovers that an employee
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in a position of trust and importance has been speculating in stocks, not
to discharge him or put him in a position of less responsibility. Prather
v. Kan 92.
7. A deposited with B, a bank, for collection, a note endorsed in blank;
B. sent it, endorsed, "Pay N., cashier, or order, for account of B." to C.,
its correspondent. C. gave nothing for the note, and collected it. Prior
to the collection B. became insolvent and was indebted to C., and C. applied
the proceeds of this note to this indebtedness. Held, 0. was liable to A.
and that the usage or custom between B. and C. to apply collections with
payment of over balances could not prevail. .Hackett v. Reynolds, 56.
8. A bank, cashing a draft, does not warrant to the acceptor bills of
lading attached thereto assecurity. Goetzet at. v Bank of Kansas City, 180.
9. The endorsement "for collection," by a bank on invoices accom-
panying bills of lading attached to drafts is not a guaranty that the bills
are genuine. It is simply a notification that the goods are to be held for
the draft if it is not accepted. Id.
10. Rumors or general reputation of bad character of the drawer do
not charge a bank with bad faith in discounting a draft and not inquiring
into the genuineness of the bills of lading which purport to secure
it. Id.
11. Newspaper articles, showing a similar prior forgery of the drawer
of a draft, with forged bills of lading attached, are not admissible to es-
tablish the bad faith of the bank cashing the same, the officers of which
never saw them. Id.
12. Declarations of the president of a bank that it was largely involved
with the drawer of a draft with a forged bill of lading attached, and that
it would have broken off its relation with him if the business had not
remained unsettled, are inadmissible, because they have no bearing on
the good faith of the officers, and, as they relate to past transactions, are
hearsay. . Id.
13. Where the holder of a draft instructs his banker to collect and hold
the proceeds until called for, and he, in violation of such instructions,
F ays the same to another by crediting the latter's account, he will be
iable to the person for whom the collection was made. International
Bank v. Ferr4 189.
14. Where the drawer of a check on one bank in favor of another, de-
livers the check to a person with verbal instructions to deposit to the
drawer's credit in the bank in favor of which it is drawn, and, instead
that person deposits it there to his own credit, as trustee for the drawer,
and afterwards draws the money, the bank is liable to the drawer of the
check for the money so paid. Sims v. U. S. Trust Co., 189.
15. The fact that a bank makes a practice of requiring the signature of
customers to accompany their deposits will not protect it from liability
to the real owner for money received without taking his signature. Id.
16. Where ai agent deposits his principal's funds in a city bank for
transmission to his principal in the country, and the deposit ticket showed
that the money was that of said principal, and the bank gave a certificate
that the amount had been carried to the credit of the country bank forsaid principal, the city bank is chargeable with full notice of the owner-
ship of the money and of the trust character in which it "was to be
transmitted to the country bank. .Drorers' .Nat..Bank: v. O'H=:are, 190.
17. The city bank transferred said funds to another city bank, which
was the correspondent of the country bank, without any notice that the
country bank was a mere trustee for another, and~the funds were placed
to the credit of the country bank, and on its failure they were applied on
its indebtedness to its correspondent bank. H /eld, that there being no
privity of contract between the depositor and the second city bank, he
could not sue it, but must sue the first bank. Id.
18. M anagers of a savings bank are liable if they participate in the
prohibited acts which lead to loss, or if they in any way promote them,
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or if they neglect to bestow that measure of care which the law exacts.
Dodd v. Wilkinson, 536.
19. It is competent to consider the illegal course of conduct in which
managers have engaged when present with their associates, in order to
determine whether such managers are liable for like illegal acts done by
such associates in their absence. Id.
20. Directors of a bank are trustees for depositors. Delano v. Cse,
537.
21. They are liable for injuries resulting from the non-observance of
ordinary care and diligence in permitting the bank to be held out to the
public as solvent, when, in fact, it was insolvent. Id.
22. A director and member of a financial committee of a savings bank
which becomes insolvent and passes into the hands ofareceiver, who acts
with the president in investing the funds on mortgage on real estate not
worth at least double the amount of the sum invested above all in-
cumbrances against the prohibition of its charter, is chargeable with the
loss on the investment. Williams v. McDonald, 272.
23. He is not chargeable with an error of judgment or a mistake, if he
uses reasonable and ordinary care. Id.
24. It is not necessary to prove fraud, but only culpable violation of
duty. rd.
25. As to increase of capital stock assessment, payment by mistake.
Delano v. Butler, 55.
26. It is not a defence to defeat securities given for a loan made by a
national bank, that the loan was for an amount in excess of the restriction
of the U. S. statute upon the amount of loans which may be made by
such banks. Mills Co. Nat. Bank v. Perry, 538.
27. Rev. Stat. U. S., 5137, provides that a national bank may "pur-chase, hold, and convey real estate * ** mortgaged to it in good faith-
by way of sectirity for debts previously contracted." iHeld, that a mort-
gage given to such bank by way of security for an indebtedness previously
contracted, and evidenced by new notes of the mortgagor, was valid.
.Farmaers' and Mtferchant' _Nat. Bank v. Wallace, 538.
28. Where bonds are deposited with a national bank, a demand for
their delivery and refusal before l)ossession is taken of them by the
federal authorities, is necessary to an action for their conversion ; but if
they are wrongfully transferred by the bank or its cashier, and put with
the funds of the bank, and reported and treated by the bank as part of its
assets, this being a conversion, no demand and refusal will be necessary
to maintain trover. Bank of M onmouth v. .Dunar, 188.
29. A national bank, after failure, has authority to deliver special de-posits. Id.
30. In a suit by an administrator for the conversion of bonds, the direc-tors aoe incompetent witnesses. Id.
31. When a bank customer employs the cashier to purchase 'bonds for
him, and then places them on special deposit with the bank, the cashier,
after the deposit, ceases to be agent for the purchaser, and if he after-
ward transfers the bonds to .the bank, to conceal his own embezzlement,
he will be acting as the agent for the bank, and notice to him of the
ownership o f the bonds will be notice to the bank. id.
32. Ah .ill in equity cannot be maintained by a shareholder in ana
tional~lbat~k to enjoin the collection of a tat assessed, in accordance with
the p r-ovisios of a State statute, upon national bank shares, on the ground
that the taxj.s at a greater rate than upon other moneyed capital, con-
trary to the Act of Congress, where it appears that theisatute provides
that the shares shall be assessed according to their actual value.
33. In arriving at that value, the liabilities of the bank are deductedfrom the credits, and the shareholder thus given the benefit of the reduc-
tion, the value of the shares being decreased to an extent proportionate
to the debts and liabilities of the banking institution ; and if the claim o
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the plaintiff is that his individual debts should be taken from the value
of the shares held by him, he should show that he owes such debts; other-
wise the law is valid as to him Rosenburg v Weekes, 538.
34. Where a savings bank, whose charter provides that the depositors
shall receive as interest their ratable proportion of the profits, after de-
ducting expenses and retaining a reasonable surplus or contingent fund,
and that neither the bank nor its managers should receive any benefit
from any deposit, or the produce thereof, goes into voluntary liquidation,
and, after paying all its depositors, has a surplus in hand, such surplus
belongs to those depositors only who had deposits when the winding up
proceedings were commenced, and to the exclusion of all those who with-
drew their deposits prior to that time, and will be distributed among them
ratably according to the amount of their respective deposits. Morristown
Inst.for Savings v. .oberts, 336.
BANKRUPTCY. See CREDITORS' BInm, 1.
BENEFICIARY. See TRusts, 1, 2. TRUSTEE, 1-4.
BENEFIT SOCIETIES.
1. Where a benefit society has provided the method for the expulsion
of its members, the courts will not undertake to supervise its action by
determining that its judgment of expulsion in a particular case was not in
accordance with its by-laws, or was for causes that had no foundation in
fact; but where the expelled member has appealed to a higher tribunal
within the order, as provided by its rules, and that tribunal has reversed
the decision of the lower tribunal, and ordered it to restore the member
to all his privileges, he will be treated by the courts as a member where
his right to share in the funds is involved, provided the appellate tribu-
nal is without power to enforce its order of restitution. The chancellor
cannot restore the member to membership. Schmidt v. Abraham Lincoln
Ldge, 274.
2. Mandamus will not lie to compel the restoration of an expelled
member. -d.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. See INSURA..cE (LiFE), 11-14.
1. A bill of excetions should not contain the whole charge, but only
state the matters of law excepted to. Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. .Raddin,
276.
2. Itcannot be sustained to an instruction, or a refusal to instruct,
without showing that there was evidence to which the instruction given
or refused was applicable. Id.
BILL OF EXCHANGE. See CHEcK, 3.
A hank, being the payee and owner of an accepted bill, is under no
duty to the acceptor to apply funds which the drawer has with it on
general deposit, to payment of the bill. Flournoy v. First Nat. Bank of
Jeffersonville, and., 537.
BILL OF LADING. See BANK.s, 8-12. Comuox CARR ImS, 7-9. Pa N-
CIPAL AND AGENT, 3. SALE, 3.
BOARDING. See CoNTRAcT, 3.
BOND. See BANKS, 1, 23, 30,31. DAyAGE 10. PnmecipAL AND SURTY,
1. SURETY, 1.
BOOK ENTRIES. See EVIDENcr, 3.
BOUNDARY. See EVIDENCE, 15.
1. Generally natural objects called for in a deed will govern courses
and distances, but where a line is actually run and marked and a corner
made, such line is the true one, although the deed calls for a natural
object not ieached by such line. Baxter v. Wilson, 124.
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2. The number of acres in a deed are no part of the description, ordin-
arily, but where the description is doubtful, it may have weight as a cir-
cumstance in aid of the description. Baxter v. Wilson. 124.
3. A lot was conveyed by a description of "bounded N. by lot T. W.,
by Wood Creek, etc." The bank of the creek was precipitous, being a natural
wall several feet high, and no attempt had been made to use its water for
power or otherwise. Held, That such description was not intended to
include any part of the waters of the creek or water rights therein.
:fall v. Whitehall Water Power Co., 64.
4. Where, by a statute, commissioners were "authorized and required to
lay off a tract of land of two miles square near Friday's Ferry, on the
Congaree River," to establish a town, and by the map, prepared by them,
the N., S. and E. boundaries of the town were laid down as straight lines,
two miles in length; but the W. boundary, where the Congaree River
runs, was left open, in a proceeding where the question was whether any
part of a bridge over the said river was within the city, so as to be subject
to taxation, it was held that it must be presumed that the comm ssioners
did the duty required or them, and laid out the west boundary in a
straight line running up and down the Congaree. ,State v. City of Columbia
604.
BOYCOTT. See CAUSE OF AcTIow, 6-9.
BRIDGE. See DAMAGES, 4.
BROKER. See CommIssIozxs,4.
BUCKET-SHOPS. See GAZraM=G, 1. ILLEGAL BUSnMES, 1.
BUILDING AND SAVING ASSOCIATIONS. See AssociATIONs, 1.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
In an action on a promissory note, where the defendant meets the prima
fade case established by the production of the note by evidence that the
money for which the note was given and delivered to him as a gift from
hisfather, of whose estate plaintiff is administrator, and that a note was
given simply because it was uncertain whether the sum, or part of it,
would not be needed to pay his father's debts, the burden of proving a
consideration is with the plaintiff. Perley v. _Perey, 337.
BUSINESS SIGNS. See LEAsE, 2.
BY-LAWS. See CORPORATIoN, 5, 6.
CAPITAL STOCK. See BA.Ks, 25.
CASES EXAMINED.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113: Chicago, etc., Rd. v. Iowa, Id. 155:
Peik v.-Chicago, etc., Rd., Id. 164. Wabash, etc.,.Rd. v.llinois, 57.
CASHIER. See BRxxs, 1, 28, 31. PtomissonY NoTE, 1.
CAUSE OF ACTION. See LiminTATwos (STATUTE OF), 3.
1. A civil action for assault and battery may be maintained -.lthough
the assault and battery were committed in the course of a fight engaged
in by the mutual consent of plaintiff and defendant; but such consent can
be shown in mitigation of damages. Barholt v. Wriht, 531.
2. A city which has authorityto abate nuisances gives no cause of action
against itself by its failure to do so. J'ames' Admr'z v. Trustees of Har-
rodsburg, 339.
3. Where a passer-by is injured by a stone thrown from a town lot,
whose owner was engaged in blasting, he cannot sue the town on the
ground that it had permitted the owner of the lot to blast. Id.
4. A professor, although his employment was not authorized by a
formal resolution of the trustees of the college, may recover his salary
where it is shown that he performed the services, that the corporation
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had the benefit of them, and its officers should have known that he ex-
pected to be paid, and that he was advertised as a professor in their cata-
logue. Tyler v. T-ustees of the Tualtli Academy and Paciic Unirersity, 339.
5. The city of Corpus Christi owned the franchise of collecting tolls on
all freight that passed through a certain channel, and granted it to M. &
C. upon consideration of keeping the channel at the depth of eight feet
and the width of one hundred feet throughout its entire length. M. &
C. failed to do this during Mlay, 1881, and the city notified them to per-
form their contract, and, by ordinance, suspended the collection of tolls
until the channel should be restored, which ordinance was in force during
May, 1881. Held, that M. & C. could not recover tolls during that month.
.Morris v. The Schooner Leona, 340.
6. The procurement of workmen, who are employed upon just and satis-
factory wages, to quit work In a body for the purpose of inflicting injury
and damage upon the employer by persons who are not in his employ,
and until the employer should accede to demands of such outside per-
sons which he is under no obligation to grant, constitute in law a mali-
cious and illegal interference with the employer's business, which is
actionable. Old Dominion Steam.hip Co. v. McFKenna et al., 420.
7. Declaring and attempting to enforce a boycott for the purpose of
compelling an employer to pay such rate of wages to his employees as
the boycotters who are not in his employ might demand, are acts render-
ing the boycotter liable in damages, and also misdemeanors at common
law as well as by Pen. Code N. Y., 168. Id.
8. All combinations and associations designed to coerce workmen to be-
come members of such combinations or associations, or to interfere with,
obstruct, vex, or annoy them in working or in obtaining work because
they are not members, or in order to induce them to become members, or
designed to prevent employers from making a just discrimination in the
rate of wages paid to the skillful and to the unskillful; and all associa-
tions designed to interfere with the perfect freedom of employers in the
proper management and control of their lawful business, or to dictate in
any particular the terms upon which their business shall be conducted, or
by means of threats of injury or loss, by interfering with their property
or traffic, or with their lawful employment of others, or designed to
abridge any of these rights-are pro tanto illegal combinations or asso-
ciations; and all acts done in furtherance of such intentions by such
meani, and accompanied by damage, are actionable. Id.
9. An action to recover damages from those who have combined to do
such an injury to a plaintiff's business, and the use of his property, is "an
action for an injury to property," within the meaning of section 549, subd.
2, Code Civil Prac. N. Y., and an order for the arrest of defendants
may be granted. Id.
10. In an action upon a draft drawn upon and certified by defendant,
which had been fraudulently altered in amount, the plaintiffs case was,
that before taking the draft he asked defendant's teller if the certification
was good, and was told that it was after the teller had carefully examined
the draft; that notice had previously been given by the drawer to the de-
fendant of the miscarriage of the draft, and a request to stop payment;
and, in the ordinary usage of banks, it was the duty of the teller, before
answering plaintiff's question, to compare the draft with his certification
book and book of stopped payments; and that said question related not
merely to marks of certification, but to the draft as certified. Held, that;
aside from the question of usage, plaintiff had a right to go to the jury
on the question whether the inquiry made of the teller was understood by
the parties as referring to the validity of the certification, at the time it
was shown to the teller, or only to the marks of certification, and also on
the question whether it was culpable negligence for the teller to answer
the question without referring to the books. Cewa v. Bank of i. Y. Bank-
ing .Asso., 403.
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CAVEAT EMPTOR. See SArI 2.
CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT. See Ac'ox, 1. DEosm's, 1, 2. PnUNOI-
PAL AND AGENT, 2.
1. A certificate of deposit is a promissory.note; it is due immediately,
and no demtrnd is necessary to ,et the btatute of limitations running.
.Mitc el v. Wilkins, 674. Garran v. Witter, 272.
2. A certificate of deposit contains by implication of law a promise to
repay the depositor his money. Lang v. Straus, 115.
3. The law is a factor in all contracts. d.
4. Parol evidence is not admissible to vary the legal obligation of a
contract implied from the language employed by the parties. Id.
CESTUI QUE TRUST. See TnuSTEE, 1-4.
CHAMPERTY.
A contract by which an attorney depends on the contingency of success
for payment for all services, and the client agrees to furnish evidence and
pay all actual costs, and that the attorney shall be entitled to very large
and liberal fees, is not champertous nor void for maintenance. .Blaisdell
v. Ahe,-n 403.
CHARGE OF COURT. See CnnmAL LAw, 20-22. Juny, 2-5.
CHARTER. See CoRroATIox, 2,4.
1. It is a tacit condition annexed to the creation of every corporation,
that it is subject to dissolution by forfeiture of its franchise for willful
misuser or non-user in regard to matters which go to the essence of the
contract between it and the State. Darnell v. State, 338.
2. The mode of trying the issue is by quo warranto. .1d.
3. Where it was the intention of the charter of a turnpike company to
establish a ferry merely as an incident to the turnpike, the privilege of
maintaining the ferry falls with the revocation of the turnpike franchise.
Id.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See EQUITY, 4.
CHECKS. See BANKs, 14. DrosiTs, 4.
1. The essential characteristic of a check is that it shall be instantly
payable on demand. llerchants' _Nat. Bank v. Ritzinger, 189.
2. An instrument in the form of a check is not a draft or bill of ex-
change merely because it is drawn by a party out of the state on a bank
in the state, or contains the words "original" and "second unpaid." Id.
3. The issue of more than one copy of a check or bill of exchange,
does not render the instrument conditional. Id.
CHURCHPROPERTY.
A parsonage is exempt from taxation, under the Missouri stat.
Bishop's Besidence, etc., v. Hudson, 544.
CITIZENSHIP. See JURIsDIcTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS, 2, 3.
CLAIM OF TITLE. See EsToPPEL, 8,
COLLECTIONS: See BANus, 3, 7,13.
COLOR OF TITLE, 409.
COMMERCE. See TAxES, 2.
COMMERCIAL PAPER. See CouroAToiS, 11-14.
COMMISSIONS.
]. Where one is appointed in a will both executor and trustee, he is
entitled to commissions, calculated on the corpus of the estate, in each
capacity. Pitney v. Everson, 275.
-EX.
COMMISSIONS.
2. Where a real estate broker is employed to find a purchaser, but not
to execute a contract ol behalf of tile seller, lie is entitled to his com-
missions where lie has found a purchaser ready, able, and willing to com-
plete the purchea in accordance with the terms agreed upon between
the broker and the owner, although the latter is unable to consummate
the sale becau-e his wife will not sign the deed. Hamlin v. Schulte, 106.
3. The fact that S. hired J. to sell realty belonging to his wife, at the
same time telling J. that it is his wife's property, does not, of itself, con-
stitute S. his wife's agent, as to J., so as to relieve him of liability to J.
for the commissions for the sale, the question being as to whom J. gave
credit. S. became personally liable if lie undertook to be so, and this
might be inferred from the fact that he contracted with the plaintiff in
his own name and without any qualification. Jarvis v. Schaefer, 406.
4. That J. is employed by the buyer of the property to negotiate for it
does not relieve S. of liability to payJ. his commission, if S. knew of J.'s
employment by the buyer, and if buyer and seller came together and
settled the terms; the agent simply procuring for each a vendor or a
buyer, as the case might be. Id.
COMMON CARRIERS.
1. A Sleeping Car Co. is bound to use reasonable care to guard a pas-
senger from theft. Lewis v. Slceing Car Co., 191.
2. It cannot relieve itself of such liability by posting a notice to that
effect, where the passenger neither saw nor knew of such notice. Id.
3. It is evidence of negligence on part of defendants, that another pas-
senger lost a sum of money at the same time as plaintiff; and that the
porter was asleep early in the morning, and was required to be on duty
thirty six hours continuously. Ird.
4. The Pullman Palace Car Co. is not liable in damage for refusing to
sell sleeping-car accommodations to a person not havingaproper railroad
ticket entitling him to the use of such accommodations. Lawrence v..Pul-
maa Palace Car Co., 517.
5. The fare paid by a passenger to a carrier includes the transportation
ofhii b.tg.e, and tie carrier has a lien thereon for his fare, and may
det tin the same until payment. .jberts v. Koe ler, 293.
6. R. pur liased an unconditional ticket from P. to A., and, after his
ticket had been taken up by the conductor, stopped over at G., leaving
his bagg ige to be carried to A., where it was taken in charge by the em-
ployees. On the next day R. got on the train to A., but refused to pay
the fare. Ila wai carried to A., but h s baggage was detained for his
fare. HM.,, that the journey from P. to A. was performed under onecon-
tract, mo lified by the action of R. in stopping over, whereby he incurred
au additional charge for his trauspo:tation, for which the carrier had a
lien on the baggage so long asit rem tined in his possession. _M.
7. A parol undertaking was made by a railroad company to provide
cars on a particular day to) transp,,rt cattle, with knowledge of the ship-
per's purpose t- have the cattle delivered ap the point of destination for
a par'tieular market day. The cars were not provided, and the cattlewere
sent at a later day under a bill of lading which limited the company's
liability as to detention, measure of damages, etc., for a reduced rate of
freight. Held, the parol undertamking was not merged in the bill of
lading, and the shipper w:as entitled to damages consequent upon the de-
tention. Hamilton v. West. . C. B. Co, 675.
8. Under the circumstances the shipper would be entitled to special
damages. Id.
9. P. sent cotton to T. to be made up into bales there and forwarded.
The work of putting into bales was done by the carrier, under the direc-
tion of P., who selected for shipment the particular bales to fill orders.
Bills of lading were sometimes issued by the cmirrier before P. separated
the particular bales from the mass. P. drew ag diust shipments with bills
VOL. XXXV.-103
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of lading attached, and his drafts were discounted at the local bank. Five
hundred and twenty-five bales, marked it the margin as of a particular
quality, were selected and shipped to K. The bill describedthein as
"contents unknown," "marked and numbered as per margin." The con-
tents were found, on arrival, not to correspond with the marks on the
margin. K., who had honored the draft, refused to receive the cotton,
sold it on account of the carriers, after notice to them, and sued on the
bill of lading to recover from the carrier the amount of bis loss. Hdd,
(1) Bill of lading was not a guarantee by carrier that the cotton was of
the quality described; (2) that the liability of the carrier as a ware-
houseman could not be enforct d in this suit; (3) that defendants were
not liable as common c-irriers from points south of T. for specific bales
consigned to K; (4) that their liability as such only began when spe-
cific lots were marked and de.signated at T., and set apart to correspond
with a bill of lading then or previously issued. St. Louis, lron M. & S.
Bd. v. Knigh, 603.
COMM 1NICATION TO THE PUBLIC OF LITERARY PROPERTY.
See LITERARY PROPERTY, 1.
CONDITION. See CHARTER, 1.
CONDITIONAL ORDER. See CONTRACT, 15, 16.
CONDITIONAL STATUTORY JURISDICTION. 481.
CONFLICT OF LAW. See Wnus, 4.
CONFESSIONS. See EVIDENCE, 14.
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS. See ATTORNEY AND C I NT, 1.
WITNESSES, 2.
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS. See TRusTEE, 1-4. TUJwu. IN-
FLUEFNCE, 1.
CONSIDERATION. See BuRDEN OF PROOF, 1. FRAUDULENT CoNVEvY-
ANCE, 2. Gnrrs INTER VIvos, 3.
CONSPIRACY. See CORPORATION, 10.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See DAAGEs, 6-8. EmmNT DorAN, 1-3.
EXTRADITION, 1-3. JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS, 2-7.
LIEN, 2. LEGISLATIVE GRANT, 1. POLICE POWEn, 1-4. STATUTES,
2-7. TAXRs 2.
1. All doubts as to the constitutionality of a statute should be resolved
in favor of its validity. Powell v. Commonwedlth, 58.
2. A grant in a State constitution of a privilege to a corporation is not
subject-to repeal or change by the legislature. .New Orleavs v. H=1on,
121.
3. The legislature has authority to declare what district is benefited by
a local improvement, and to levy on such district an assessment therefor ;
and the courts will interfere to set aside such assessment only where there
has been a manif st abuse of discretion. Lenat v. TiLson, 539.
4. A statute which provides that where an injury is done to a building
or other property by fire communicated by a locomotive, without contrib-
utory negligence on the part of the occupier of the property, the railroad
company shall be liable in damages, is not unconstitutional. Grissdll v.
Housato ic B. B. Co., 260.
5. A statute of a State which provides that in capital cases, in cities of
over 100,000 inhabitants, the State shall be allowed fifteen peremptory
challenges, while elsewhere in the State it is allowed eight only, does not
deny the equal protection of 'he laws to a person tried in a city of over
100,000 inhabitants. Hays v. Missour, 277.
6. A transportation of goods, etc., from two different points within a State
tothe same point without the State, is "commerce among the States," even
INDEX. 819
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
as to that part of the voyage which lies within the State ; is national in
its character; and regulated by Congress exclusively. Wabash, etc., Ry. v.
Illinois, 57.
7. A Statestatute intendedto regulate or tax thetransmission ofproperty,
etc., from one State to another, is not within that classof legislation which
the States may enact in the absence of legislation by Congress. Id.
8. A foreign insurancecompany, which has been taxed in a foreign State
at a higher rate than home companies are, because its home State has im-posed a greater tax upon foreign than home companies within its jurisdic-
tion, is not" a person" within the" jurisdiction" of such foreign State to
whom "the equal protection of the laws" has been denied, in violation
of the Fourteenth Article of the U. S. Constitution, because such cor-poration was not with n the jurisdiction of such foreign State until ad-
mitted by that State on a compliance with the condition of admissionimposed i , . he payment of the tax as a license fee. nhi/a. Fire
Asso'n v. Yew York, 62.
CONTINGENT FEES. See CHXAm'ETY, 1.
CONTRACT. See B. -, 14. CERTIeATE 05' DEPOSIT, 2, 4. CHAM:PRY,1. CoM~oN CARRIERS, 5, 6. COVENAT, 1, 2. DAMAGES, 9-1.
Girm' INTER Vivos, 3. INFANT, 1, 2, 3. JURy, 2. IslSrUSAw, FIRE,
6. LEGISLATIVE G RANT, i. MASTER AND SERVANT, 5, 9. RsAnL-
ROADS, 11. SALE, 2, 3.
1. An agreement in a deed that any controversy between the parties
shall be settled by an arbitrator is invalid; the courts cannot be ousted of
their jurisdiction by such agreements. Dugu v. Thzomas, 473.
2. _A contract made by a person so destitute of reason as not to know
the consequences of his contract, though his incompetency be produced
by intoxication, is voidable, and may be avoided by himself, though the
intoxication was voluntary and not produced by the circumvention of the
other party. .Bush V..B,'einig, 37.3. G. contracted with L. for board, room and lights for himself and
wife, at an agreed price per week, no time being specified. The wife was
absent a great part oft time. Held, this was simply a contract from
week to week, and G. was entitled to a reasonable deduction on account ofhis wife's ahsence. Green V. Laveder, 605.
4. Money lent with the knowledge or belief on the part of the lenderthat it is to be used for gambling purposes, and without any participation
by him in the illegal acts, cannotbe recovered. Tyler v. Carlisle, 473.
5. He may recover from the borrower if he demand a return of the
money before it is actually used. Id.
6. A stipulation in a written contract for the construction of a railroad
that the engineers of the road should make final estim:tes of the work
done thereunder, and such estimates should be conclusive as against the
contractor, "without recourse or appeal," is invalid, and will not deprivehim of the right to resort to the courts for redress of wrongn or recovery
of what is due. Louisville . & St. L. .y. "7o. v. .Doaegan, 540.
7. Where an obligation for the payment of borrowed money, without
security, provides for its payment in monthly instalments, andl also that
upon default in the payment of any instalment the whole debt shallbecome due, time is of the essence of the contract. A waiver of any
default in payment must be upon a sufficient consideration. Bishop v.
.Lawrence, 277.
8. Where a party has obligated himself to pav a given sum of money
by a future day which is fixed as the time for full performance, and it is
agreed thmt the sum to be paid may be increased or diminisld by the
performance of another act left to the option of the parties, the law will
require either party to exercise his option and perform such act before
the full payment of the sum named is made. After full payment the
INDEX.
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party will be held to have waived his right to do the act entitling him to
a further sum. Hamilton v. Scullq, 121.
9. Contracts in restraint of trade are invalid, and this is so even when
the restraint is partial, unless it is reasonable. Mandeville v. Har-
man, 383.
10. The test whether a restraint is reasonable or not, is to consider
whether it is only such as is necessary to afford a fair protection to the
interests of the party to whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere
with the interests of the public. Id.
11. A complainant is not entitled to a preliminary injunction when the
right on which he founds his claim is, as matter of law, unsettled. Id.
12. A contract by which the owners of several water rights in a.stream
agree with each other, under a penalty of $10,000, "agreed and liqui-
dated damages," not to sell to certain parties, or any other peisons who
may now or hereafter be endeavoring to obtain the possession of said
water right, and not to make any settlement or compromise with such
parties except by the written consent of the others, no limit of time being
set, is void as against public policy. Ford v. Gregson, 605.
13. A railroad company agreed to load on a vessel cotton, to be de-
livered on board October 18th and 19th. The (otton was not delivered
for several days aft, r those dates, and the vessel was obliged to pay de-
murrage, after giving the railroad company repeated notice of the conse-
quences of its failure. field, the subsequent acceptance of the cotton
was not a waiver of the stipulati, n as to time, and the vessel could re-
cover from the railroad company the amount of demurrage. Noifolk and
IV. 1Ld. Co. v. Shippers' Compres Co., 474.
14. Such a contract made by a railroad engaged in the business of
transporting merchandise is not ultra vires, but properly incidental to
the purposes of its charter. Id.
15. A written order fir goods delivered to the selling agent of a mann-
facturer, with the understanding that the agent was to hold it for three
or four days, subject to tle order of the signer, and to destroy it if the
latter should so decide, is not a contract, nor an ofibr, until delivered to
the manufacturer with the signer's consent. Mforris v. Brightman, 192.
16. A letter written by the signer of the order to the agent, the day
after the delivery of the order, is admissible in evidence to show that the
right has been exercised. Id.
17. Where a contract of purchase of personal property is made, and
part of the consideration is paid down, and the balance is to be paid and
delivery made "on or before" a certain date, and the purchaser notifies
the seller beforesaid date that lie is ready to pay the balance of purchase-
money and accept delivery, and the seller replies that he is not, and can-
not be ready to deliver until said date, the purchaser may rescind and re-
coverliaek the money already paid. Dakota Stoch and Grazing Co. v.
Price, 804.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. See NEGL G cE, 7-11. RAMIROAS, 2.
CORPORATION. See AssocxArroN, I. CxrsE oF Acrrow, 4. CHARTER,
1, 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2. CONTRACT, 13,14. DIVIDENns, 2. IN-
SOLVENCY, 1. PROMISSORY NOTES, 3, 8. RATIFICATION, 1. STOCK, 1.
SuBscairioN, 1-3. TAxATION, 3. TAXES, 3. TuRNPIK COMPANY, 1-3.
1. The fact thata corporation has changed itsname, without any change
of its membership, is no defence to an action instituted aaainst it under
its former name. Wefley v. Shenandoah Iron, L. .M. & .1. Co., 805.
2. Where o -e person becomes the sole owner of all the stock of a pri-
vate corporation, he may renounce his rights under the act of incorpora-
tion, and conduct the business as an individual. Srwft v. Smith, Diron &
Co., 58.
3. Where one person is, at the same time, vice president, treasurer, and
the managing and controlling officer, of a corporation, his relations toward
INDEX:
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the creditors and stockholders require the utmost good faith and scrupu-
lous attention to the affairs of the corporation. Thomi v. Sweet, 605.
4. Vhen the charter of a railroad c)mpany requires that the stock
shall be paid for in cash, and no certificate shall issue until such payment
is made, it is a sufficien' compliance with the statute prescribing that
the charter of such companies must set forth the time when, and
the manner in w.aich, "the stock shall be paid for." New Orleas & G.
B. Co. v. Frank, 540.
5. A by-law which prohibits the transfer of stock by a stockholder with-
out the consent of all the stockholders, is against public policy and void.
In rc Petition of .Mlaus, 98.
6. The duty of a secretary, in making transfers of stock, is purely min-
isterial. Id.
7. Where preferred stockholders are entitled to a dividend in advance
of the common stockholders, they are not entitled, as of right, to divi-
dends payable outof the net profits accruing in any particular year, unless
is directors declare, or ought to declare, a dividend payable out of such
profits; whether such dividend should be declared is a matter for the di-
rectors, in the first instance. New York, etc., Rd. v. Nichols, 122.
8. Where it was provided that "the capital stock should be $10,000, di-
vided into four hundred shares of $25 each, and no business should be
transacted at any meeting of stockholders unless a majority of the stock
is represented, except to organize its meeting and adjourn, it was held,
that, although only two hundred and forty-three shares had been sub-
scribed for, it required two hundred and one to constitute a majority.
Ellsworth WMollen aiffy. Co. v. Faunce, 605.
9. Where a statute provided that "no corporation shall issue stock or
bonds except for money, lab ,r done, or money or property actually re-
ceived," an increase in the value of the property in which the original
stock is invested will not justify an issue of additional capital stock to
the stockholders as a stock dividend. Fitzpatrick v. Dispatch Pub. Co.,
605.
10. A corporation may be sued for damages caused by a conspiracy.
Buffalo Lub. Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 605.
1t. A manufacturing c.)rporation has implied power to make negotiable
paper for use within the scope of its business, but not to become a party
to notes for the accommodation of others. National Bank of _epublic of
New York v. Young, 274.
12. Where it has such power under any circumstances, a bonafide holder
has a right to presumethat the paper was issued under the circumstances
which give the requisite authority, and such paper is no more liable to
be impeached for any infirmity than other commercial paper. Id.
13. Notice of facts such as would put a prudent person upon inquiry,
which if pursued would have disclosed the infirmity of the paper, is not
sufficient to impeach the title of the holder of negotiable paper taken for
value before maturity, so as to let in defences to which the paper would
be subject in the handseof the original party. _Id.
14. To defeat such holder's recovery it mnust be proven that be took
such paper under such circumstances as show that he had knowledge of
some infirmity, or with snsuicionwtreadtit ldtyorhso-
duct was fraudulent. Id. - ihrgr ois aiiy rhscn
COSTS.
When judgment is in favor of the executor in probate proceedings,
costs cannot be allowed to the unsuccessful contestants. In re Will of Wil-
son, 64.
COURTS. See COz nCTS, 1, 6. STATUTES, 2, 7.
COURTS, U. S., JURISDICTION OF, 2, 7.
COURTS,T1h.S. DISTRICT. See Arnx, TXv, 1.
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COVENANT.
1. In an action upon an indenture, in which the defendant had cove-
nanted to transfer to the plaintiff "the moneys originally deposited in
her name in the P. savings bank, amounting to about $284" (the moneyso deposited having been previously transferred by the plaintiff to the
defendant), the words of the covenant will be construed as an agreement
by the defendant to transfer to plaintiff all the money originally depos-
ited by the latter in said bank, although it, in fact, amounted to a sum
much greater than $284; and when defendant has paid out a part of the
sum found due under the covenant, the plaintiff is entitled to interest on
the balance, no demand being necessary. Birch v.. Hutchings, 639.
2. A receipt by plaintiff of a bank book containing a credit of $284.01
would not create an estoppel as against her, where it appeared that she
was an ignmorant person, and there was evidence that she did not know
what she was signing when she put her mark to the indenture. .id.
CREDITORS. See/L. SZro r~T POR, 1, 2, 3,4. B -arxs, 2. FstxnUria-w
OONVEYA- CE, 1, 2. HUSBA~N .AND WIFE, 2. LANDLORD A2ND TEN -
ANT, 3.
CREDITOR'S BILL.
* 1. To a creditor's bill to annul deeds made by a debtor, on the ground
of fraud, alleging that the debtor was thereafter adjudged a bankrupt, but
never obtained his discharge, the assignee in bankruptcy is a necessary
party. Tabb v. Htughes, 676.
2. Where, upon the pretended organization of a bank, a person allowed
himself to be held out as presidenit, and after the failure of the bank, he
was sued by a depositor for the amount of ils deposit, and a recovery was
had against him which he paid, such depositor cannot afterwards come in
and prove his entire debt against the bank, in a proceeding instituted by
its creditors for the purpose of distributing its assets in payment of its
debts. Dobson v. &qmonto, 271.
CRIM INAL LAW. See CONSTITUTIONAL. LAW, 5. EXTADITION, 1-S.
FORCIBLE ENTRY,I1. JURY, 1. M/ARRIAGE, 1-3. Mu[BREE, 1. NRW
T~RIL, 1.
1. Tht a defendant is tried for a misdemeanor withouit a plea is a
mere technical error and'not ground for reversal. All/yn v. State, 540.
2. That defendantwas actingas agentis notadefence in aprosecution. .Td.
3. The court may, in its discretion, permit counsel for the prosecution
to read to the jury, decisions of courts upunn insanity, when that is the de-
fence in a trial for murder. Terrtowry v. Htarl, 677.
4. A motion for a new trial was made in accused's absence, and, when
present subsequently, he was given an opportnnity to renew it, but re-
fused. Held, the error of proceeding in his absence was cored. .Bond v.Commonwealth, 676.
5. 1If is not error to state, in a charge upon the defence of insanity, that
"the law rejects the doctrine of what is called" emotional insanity,' which
beginson the eve of the criminal act and leaves off when it is committed."
.People v. Kernezghan, 606.
6. Where one is convicted under an act that is repealed after convic-
tion, but, before judgment thereon, the proceedings are arrested, and
authority to pronounce judgment withdrawn. Ste v. Williams, 405.
7. Where a law provides that "when imprisonment is part of the sen-
tence, the term shall lhe fixed, and its commencement and ending speci-
fied," a prisoner who escapes before his time is served and remains at
large till his time is up. is liable to arrest for the purpose of carrying hissentence into effect. .fr~o.y v. State, 475.
S. Detaining a prisoner arrested without warrant longer than is reason-
ably necessary to obtain a warrant, then handcuffing him, carrying himout of the county, ande incarcerating him for days without a warrant, is false
imprisonment. Potter v. Swindle 679.
9. Where the prisoner's evidence shows that, after a conflict with the
INDEX.
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deceased, which left him unresisting. the prisoner "let go" of him, and
went after and obtained an axe, neglecting to use a knife which lay at
hand on tile ground, and ended his victim's life therewith, such action is
not unpremeditated and prompted by the frenzy of the struggle, so as to
reduce the crime to "manslaughter." People v. Beckwith, 18.
10. In a trial for arson, evidence wholly circumstantial that defendant
who bad been unfriendly toward the prosecutor, became particularly
polite just before the burning; that he claimed to have spent the night
at a place some distance away, but was seen going toward prosecutor's
farm one and one-half hours before the fire, and was in that neighborhood
at daybreak; that lie requested witness to swear that a boy likely to testify
in the case was not of good sense, and was refused; and that when com-
mitted, he said he could find two witnesses to prove another person's
guilt, if prosecutor would go bail for him, but said nothing about it after-
wards, all tend to throw suspicion on the defendant, but do not so con-
nect him with the felony as to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 540.
11. On a trial for murder, a separation of the jury, by which some of
them remain in thedining-room of the hotel while others go out of their
sight into a saloon with the sheriff, during the progress of the trial, and
after the jury were put in charge of the sheriflf is ground for reversal.
,State v Murray, 338.
12. Where, on an indictment for murder, a main ground upon which a
verdict of guilty is arrived at on circumstantial evidence is the identifi-
cation of a knife as belonging to defendantby a principal witness, an affi-
davit by a member of tile grand jury to the effect that such witness had
made very different statements as to the character and description of the
knife outside of the court-room to those made by him on the witness
stand, is newly discovered evidence, sufficient to form grounds for a new
trial. Id.
13. A homicide, committed by a military guard without malice, and in
the performance of his supposed duty as a soldier, is excusable, unless it
was manifestly beyond the scope of his authority, or was such that a man
of ordinary sense and understanding would know that it was illegal.
Uaited States v. James Clark, 693.
14. The sergeant of a guard has the right to shoot a military convict,
if there be no other possible means of preventing his escape. Id.
15. The common-law distinction between felonies and misdemeanors
has no application to military offence. Id.
16. While the finding of a court of inquiry acquitting the prisoner of
all blame is not a legal bar to a prosecution, it is entitled to great weight
as an expression of the views of the military court of the necessity of
using a musket to prevent the escape of the deceased. .d.
17. A circuit court of the U. S. hasjurisdiction of a homicide commit-
ted by one soldier upon another within a military reservation of the
United States. Id.
18. Attempts to commit both felonies and misdemeanors are misde-
meanors, and indictable as such; when the attempt is a bare solicitation,
it is not indictable, if the substantive crime is but a misdemeanor. Lamb
v. State, 641.
19. When, on a trial for murder, of which the accused was the only
witness, it appears from his own evidence that he, armed with a rifle and
revolver, sought out deceased, while engaged chopping wood, and shot
him when he was in the act of fleeing, having dropped his axe, there be-
ing no evidence that there was any gun which he could get, the court will
exclude evidence of threats by deceased, as in such a case they would be
no justification. Thomason v. Territory of New lfeieo, 655.
20. Where there is no evidence tending in the slightest manner to show
a killing in self-defence, it is not error to refuse to instruct the jury on
the law of self-defence. Id.
INDEX.
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21. Where there is no evidence to indicate murder in any degree less
than the first, it is not error to refuse to instruct the jury on the other
degrees of murder. !Vlwnawson v. Te, ritory of .New Mexico, 655.
22. Where, in a trial before a jury, some of whom could not under-
stand or speak English, and others 8panish, the court interpreter is, at the
request of the jury, especially sworn and sent with them into the jury
room, to enable them to communicate, there is no presumption that such
interpreter acted improperly and to the prejudice of the defendant; it is
for defendant to show prejudice, if any. Id.
23. Where the State has developed its case by witnesses called, it is not
error to refuse to compel the prosecution to call all the witnesses to con-
versations with defendant who were known and present. Id.
CROSS-EXAMINATION. See EVIDENCE, 21.
CUSTODY OF JURY. See NEW TRIAL, 1.
CUSTOM. See BANms, 7, 15.
DAMAGES. See ArmnAtLTy, 1. CAUSE OF ACTIox, 1. Comror CAR-
BRmxts, 4, 7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4. EMINENT DoAIN, 2, 3. x-
JURIES TO PROPERTY, 1. LANDLORD AND TENANT, 5. LiBEL, 83.
MORTGAGE, 3. NEGLIGENCE. 3,4. RAILROADS. 3. RIPARIAN RIGHTS,
3,4. bTREETS, 1. TunNP.KE Co., 1,3. WATERS AND VATER-CouRsEs,
1,5,6.
1. Prospective damages to realty-successive actions or single action,
281, 345.
2. Where lands injured by a permanent nuisance, all damages, past,
present, and future, may be recovered in one action, and such recovery is
a bar to all future suits for the same cause. .Railroad v. Loeb, 123.
3. A purchaser of land, after it has been damaged by a railroad, may
recover for any injury he received by reason of the adoption of any new
feature in the construction or operation of the road. Railroad v. McDou-
gall, 123.
4. The temporary inconveniences suffered by private persons in com-
mon with the public, by reason of the exercise of a right conferred by
law for the benefit of the public, cannot be compensated in damages.
.Hamilton v. Vicksburg Railroad, 123.
5. A married woman joined her husband in the execution of a bond,
without herprivy examination, for title to land to be made upon payment
of the purchase-money. The purchaser executed notes to the husband
for the purchase-money, and delivered them to the wife, who received
their value, but afterwards repudiated and disaffirmed her obligation and
claimed dower. Held, that if she elected to claim dower, the purchaser
wouldJsave a right to such damages as she might sustain thereby. Hodge
v. P well, 475.
6. Under an article of a constitution which provides that "mn unicipal
and other corporations and individuals, invested with the privilege of
taking private property for public use shall make just compensation for
property taken, injured or destroyed by the construction or enlargement
of their works, etc.," in a common-law action, a recovery can be had
for injury to property including noise, smoke, dirt, etc., which at
common law are common annoyances for which an action would not lie
in behalf of an individual. Thie owner is not limited to such injuries as
would have been actionable at common law if the defendant had pro-
ceeded without legislative authority. Pittsburgkq etc., Railroad v. lcCatch-
con, 59.
7. The inconvenience arising from the increased difficulty of access to
the property ; the ordinary dangerfrom accidental fire, not resulting from
negligence; and generally all matters as, owing to the peculiar location
of the road, may affect the use and future enjoyment of the property, are
proper subjects for consideration. Id.
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8. Damages are recoverable for injuries resulting from the operation of
the road after its completion. Pittsburgh, etc., .Rd. v. 1c Gutcheon, 59.
9. A provision, in a contract to put a steam boiler in a vessel, that the
contractor binds himself "to pay or allow five dollars per day as fixed,
settled and liquidated damages for all time after February 10th, 1877, till
the aforesaid boiler is delivered and tested, and the last mentioned amount,
if any, to be deducted from the last payment," which was payable Feb-
ruary 10th, 1877, "when the boiler is delivered at boat, tested and found
all right," does not prevent a suit to recover damages for a failure to de-
liver the boiler in' the time agreed; if plaintiff has, under the contract,
retained in his hands sufficient to cover the damages stipulated, that fact
may be shown in bar of the action. Mitchel v. McKinnon, 406.
10. In a bond "in the penal sum of $10,000 liquidated damages," with
a condition that certain third persons shall, within a year, release theobligee from a large number of debts held by them severally, and varying
from $8,000 to $1.0,00O each,the sum of $10,000 is a penalty and not liqui-
dated damages, and nominal damages only can he recovered where none
of the debts wvere released within the year, but immediately after there
was a discharge in bankruptcy. .Bignl v. Gould, 193.
11. In an action to recover for printing pictorial posters, hand bills,
etc., for a showman, the defence was that the printing was not done at the
time agreed upon. Held, that measure of damages in defendant's coun-
ter claim was the difference between what he was to have paid plaintfft
under the contract and what it cost him to effect the same amount of ad-
vertising. not loss of profits. Greet Wester -Printing (Jo. v. Tucker, 804.
12. A hotel keeper is entitled to damages for loss of business where a
railroad company, in blasting rocks for the road-bed, caused guests to
leave the hotel in fear of flying rocks and other debris. G..B. & I . _By.
0 . v. Doyle, 407.
13. Evidence of injury to other buildings in the immedia'e vicinity of
the hotel is admissible on thle question whether the danger from the mis-
siles was so great as to justify these fears, and authorize the departure of
the guests; for, if it was not, plaintiff would have no right to recover. Id.
14. In an action by an artist to recover the value of a portrait of chil-
dren painted for a father, which he has refused to accept, it is error to in-
struct the jury to give as damages what the picture was worth, and what
the artist's services were worth, taking into consideration the exhausting
studies necessary to acquire skill as an artist, and the time consumed and
expense incurred in acquiring professional knowledge and distinction,
as thme compensation of artists is not generally measured by the intrinsic
merit either of themselves or of their pictures. Turner v. Meson, 404.
DAMKNUMI ABSQUE INIURIA. See DAMa( ES4.
DANGEROUS MACHINERY. See M. svxa AreS SERtve, 6-8.
DEATH BY ACCIDENT. See INSURA-rcE (LIFE), 9, I0.
DECEXSED PERSONS. See EVIDE. CE, 15-P .
DECLARATIONS. See ESTOPPEL, 2, 3. EV-DEN CE, 15-17.
DECREES. See EQurry, 3.
DEDICATION.
1. A rehiziou5 camp-meeting association laid out and mapped its sea-
side property into lots, reserving a tier of blocks, extending from the
ocean, as a camp ground for religious services and tenting purposes, and
sold to A. loti fronting on this reservation, on which hie erected a resi-
dence. .Held, that the association had entered into an implied covenant
with him that this reservation should be devoted to the uses indicated,
and it had no right to divide it into lots and lease them for years with
VoL. XXX V.-I04
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the privilege of erecting thereon permanent cottages. Sennig v. Ocean
City Asso., 275.
2. The question of the fact, form, and extent of dedication of land to
public use is one of intention, and is for the jury. City of Elyin v. Beck-
with, 343.
3. Where a plan of land, bordering on a river, platted into streets and
lots, shows one of the streets extended to the banks of the river, and then
spanning the river in a direct line with the street, lines marked "Bridge,"
the questions whether or not the owner intended that the street should
extend to the middle of the stream, and whether he intended that the
lines of the street should run directly over the river, or, anticipating
accretions to the bank, intended that the dedication should be in the
direction of a line drawn at right angles with the then bank, so as to
deflect the original course of the street, are for the jury. Id.
DEED. See BOUNnARUS, 1, 2, 3. EvIDENcE, 5, 7. HusBAim AND
WIFE, 1.
1. Where the granting part of a deed would convey a fee, but to the
description of the land granted was added the clause, "for the use of a
.plank road," it was held that this clause was a limitation upon the grant
and only an easement was conveyed. Robinson v..Mitssisguoi Rd., 744.
2. The bare fact that a deed has been recorded is not sufficient evidence
that it was delivered by the grantor or accepted by the grantee or bene-
ficiary. To establish these facts, there must be other and further evi-
dence that will support such a presumption, as that the deed would
operate beneficially to the grantee, or that lie had knowledge of the
execution or recording of the deed. Giffard v. Corrigan, 448..
3. Where a deed was signed by an attorney in fact in his own name asattorney for the grantors, it was held that the execution was defective,
but, in equity, was good as an execution of the power, and would vest the
equitable title in the grantee. RPamage v.. Ramagqe 677.
4. A deed was made namiug M . R. and J. C. R. as grantees. M.L R. had
paid all of the purchase-money, and expected the deed to name herself
and C. P. R. as grantees. In consequence of the representations of J'. C.
R. the grantor inserted his name, and he went into possession. Held, if
3'. C. R. had authority to procure the insertion of his name, he held in
trust forM . B. ; if he had not, the deed was void. id.
DEFENOE. See BANms, 26. CORPORATIONS, 1. PRO0MISSORY 1NOTE, 10.
DELIVERY. See DEED, 2.
Where a note and mortgage, executed by a defendant in settlement of
a suit, are delivered to a third party to be handed to plaintiff when he
executed and delivered to said third party a release and satisfaction of
his claim, this is a good delivery in escrow. Schmdt v..Deegarn, 805.
DEMAND. See Cnxcxe, 1.
DEMURRAGE. See Cosirtc'r, 13, 14.
DEPOSITORS. See BANY~s, 2, 3, 20, 21, 34. FRAUD, 3.
DEPOSITS. See AcmnoN, 1. ASaSETS, 1. ATTORNEY AND ClIENT, 4. BANWs,
14, 16, 17, 28, 29, 31. BILL OF ExCHANGE, 1. CERTIFICATE OF DE-
roSIv, 2. EVIDENCE, 20. GIFTS, INTER VIvos, 2. TmUSTS, 2, 3, 11, 12.
1. A certificate of deposit issued by a banker in the ordinary form is in
substance and legal effect a negotiable promissory note. Carran v. Wit-
ter, 272.
2. The statute of limitations runs against such certificate from the date
of its issuance. Id.
3. An individual deposit cannot be set off against a partnership debt.
In~rntianl Bank v. Jones, 190.
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4. When a firm is dissolved which is largely indebted to a bank for
overdrafts upon its deposits, and the bank has notice of the dissolution
and of the fact that one of the partners continues the business in the old
firm name, and lie afterwards makes a deposit against which lie issues his
check, the holder will be entitled to be paid out of such deposit. Inter-
national Bank v. Jones, 190.
DESCRIPTION. See Bou-DARIES, 1,2, 3. DEED, 1. EV'IDENCF 5. IN-
suRAcE (FInE), 6.
DIRECTORS. See BAvs, 20-24, 30. ConroRAvIONe, 7.
DISMISSAL. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 2.
DISTRESS. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 4.
DIVIDENDS. See CORPoRATIOx, 7, 9, CREDITOR'S ErL,, 2.
1. A savings bank cannot appropriate and pay as a dividend to its
stockholders and depositors on the profits arising from its business, any
portion of the interest upon its loans or investments that may have
matured or accrued, but which have not been actually collected and re-
ceived in money. The People v. San Francisco Savings Union, 472.
2. A by-law provided that "dividends on the preferred stock shall first
be made semi-annually from the net earnings, not exceeding six per cent.
per annum; after which dividend, if there shall remain a surplus, a divi-
dend shall be made upon the non-preferred stock up to a like per cent.
per annum ; and should a surplus then remain of net earnings after both
of said dividends in any one year, the same shall be divided pro rata
upon all stock." Held, holders of preferred stock were entitled to a divi-
dend in each year in which any net earnings existed, but the dividends
upon the stock were not cumulative. Haze/tine v. Bdfast & X.. H. L.Bd.,
676.
DIVORCE. See ALrmoxN, 1. ATTONEY AND CL ENT, 5.
DOWER. See DAMAGrs, 5.
1. A widow has dower in mines that are opened. Whittaker v. Lindley,
275.
2. Where a mine was operated under land alloted in dower, but the
entrance to it was upon the land of another, it was held that the widow
might open an entrance upon her own land. Id.
DRAFT. See BANKs, 4, 8-12. CAusE or AcTIoN, 10. CHBcs, 1-3.
PAYMENT, 1-3.
DRUNKENNESS. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 2.
EASEMENT.
Where the owner of two tenements, or of an entire estate, has so
arranged and adapted them that one tenement, or one portion of the
estate derives a benefit and advantage from the other of a permanent,
open and visible character, and he sells a portion of the property, the
purchaser will take his property with all the benefits and burdens which
so appear at the time of the sale. Such easement need not be strictly
necessary, but only highly convenient and beneficial. Cihak v. .lehr, 59.
ELECTIONS.
Where the law provided that the certificates of the precinct com-
missioners of the vote shall be laid before the court, which "shall there-
upon ascertain and declare the result of the vote, and enter the same of
record," the court may go behind the returns to ascertain the legal vote.
Potee v. 6e/l Cb., 678.
EMINENT DOMAIN. See STREETS, 1.
1. Natural gas companies are, under Pennsylvania act of May 29, 1885,
invested with right of eminent domain. Appeal of City of Pittsburgh, 277.
INDEX.
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2. Abutters upon public streets in cities are entitled to damages sus-
tained by them by reason of a diversion of the streets from the use for
which it was originally taken, and their appropriation to other and incon-
sistent uses. Lord v. Mde. Elevated d., 342.
3. use of the streets for an elevated road cannot be legalized or sanc-
tioned by the city's authorities or the legislature without providing com-
pensation to the abutting owners of property. Id.
EMPLOYERS. See CAUSE oF AcnoN, 6-9.
ENDORSEMENT. See BA.xs, 4.
ENDORSEE. See NON-PAyxENT, 1-3.
EQUITY. See ASSIGNM1ENT FOR CREDIToRS, 4. BAN-Ks, 25, 32, 33. CoN-
TRACT, 9, 11. CREI~ TOR'S BILL, 1,2. DEEm, 3. FRAUD, 1, 3. INJU-
RIESTO PROPERTY, 1. INSURANCE (FIRE), 2,4. MORTGAGE, 4. PossES-
SION AS N oTICE, 1, 2. SCHOOL LAw, 3. STOCKHOILDES, 1, 3. SuB-
SCRIPTIONS, 1, 3. TRUSTS, 1, 3. UNINCORPORATED SocIrTiES, 1, 3.
1. Equitable jurisdiction does not depend upon the want, but the in-
adequacy, of a common law remedy. Appeal of Brush Eleciric Co., 275.
2. Equity cannot restrain the publication of a person's name and busi-
ness standing in the books of a mercantile agency. Raymond v. Russell,
193.
3. Decrees in equity operate only on the person; and suits will be en-
tertained, although the subject of the suit is situated in another state.
Wilson v. Josephs, 48.
4. A bill to foreclose a chattel mortgage cannot be stricken out for
want of proper parties, unless it is shown who should be made parties,
nor for not containing matters which are properly matters of evidence.
Howell v. Frances, 477.
5. The keeper of a boarding house for railroad employees made an
agreement with the railroad company whereby the boarding dues of each
employee were deducted from his pay and forwarded in the form of a
check to the boarding-house keeper each month. Subsequently he pro-
cured an advance of money from a bank on the credit of the amounts,
which were to fall due on the following pay-day, and by promising to turn
such amounts over to the bank. The company consented to transfer such
payments to the bank. Hed, this constituted an equitable assignment of
such sums so as to vest title in the bank as against a creditor of the board-
ing-house keeper who garnisheed the same in the hands of the company.
Chamberlin v. Gilman, 541.
6. The fact that the company, after it had consented to the transfer of
the indebtedness to the bank, continued to draw its check in favor of the
boarding-house keeper, did not divest the bank of the title acquired under
the equitable assignment. Id.
EQUITABLE TITLE. See Dram, 3.
ERROR. See Commom CARER, 7. CRIMINAL LAw, 1, 2,3. DASAGEs,
14. HuSBAND AND WIFE, 3. JURY, 1, 5.
1. The admission of immaterial evidence in rebuttal, which can have
worked no injury, is not ground for reversal. Is. 04. v. La Pointe, 124.
2. The action of the court below in giving its conclusion of the argu-
ment to counsel for either side, is not reviewable in error. Blume v. Hart-
man et al., 64.
ESCAPE. See C RmnLAL LAW, 7.
ESCROW. See DEI-VERY, 1.
ESTATE. See EAsEmENT, 1.
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ESTOPPEL. See Covmr 1, 2. INJURIES TO PROPERTY, 1. LANIDLORD
AN'D TENANT, 1. P~wcn's,. AND AGENT, 3.
1. Where owners and dealers in wheat place it with an elevator com-
pany, and knowingly permit such company to mingle it with other wheat,
and to sell from the common mass, thus clothing it with apparent owner-
ship and authority to sell the wheat, they are estopped to assert title
thereto as against an innocent purchaser for value. .Prestoa v. Mther-
spoon,. 193.
2. Plaintiff in ejectment claimed title under a mortgage foreclosure.
Defendant was the mortgagor's grantor. The consideration of the mort-
gage was in part a prior mortgage and debt due to other parties, which
were assigned to the subsequent mortgagee. Hdd, by such purchase the
subsequent mortgagee succeeded to all the rights of the prior nortgagees,
and was indirect privity with them; and evidence of declarations of the
defendant to the prior mortgagees, at the time that mortgage was made,
to the effect that he had sold the land to the mortgagor, and that it was
hers, is admissible, and will operate as an estoppel upon defendant. Ward-
law v. .Rayford, 678.
3. A purchaser at sheriff's salewho had no idea that a part of the tract
of land was covered by the levy and deed thereunder, and made declara-
tions to that effect, is not estopped from claiming title to said part. ,Stroup
v. JlMC/oskey, 678.
4. Where A. gave his note for a purchase of B., at B.'s request, to T.,
a creditor of B., and when asked, after it was due, by L., who intended to
purchase it, if the note was all right, replied, "it was all right, and he
expected to pay it," and T., upon this, bought the note, A. cannot plead
failure of consideration. Lils v. Addison, 678.
EVIDENCE. See ADvnnsE PossEssro.N, 2, 3. ATTORNEY AND CLr T, 1.
BAxNs, 11, 12, 18, 19, 30. BURDE OF PRooF, 1. CERTarIC&TE OF DE-
Posrr, 4. CoMMON CARRiERs, 3. CONTRACT, 15, 16. CRrMAL LAw,
10, 11, 19, 23. DAMAGES, 12. DEED, 2. ERROR, 1. "ESTOPPEL, 2.
JURY, ,. NEGLIGEOF 3, 4 5. PERSONAL PROPERTY, l. RAILROAD
COM MISSION, 1, 2. STATUTES, 2-7. WILL, 2, 3. WITESSES, 2, 3, 4.
UNDUE INFLUECE, 1.
1. To prove one's intention, it is not competent to prove by witness
that the intention was so and so; he must testify to acts and declarations
as showing intention. Cihak v. hehr, 59.
2. If what was overheard in a conversation is competent evidence, the
fact that the witness did not cach all that was said does not render
such parts as he did hearinadmissible. Denver &B.. Bd. C. v. Neis, 540.
3. A witness may properly testify that entries made by him in a book
of account are correct, although he has no independent recollection of the
transactions there entered. Curran v. Witter, 272.. 4. Where the keeper of a "bucket-shop" sued a telegraph company for
refusing to furnish him with quotations, the defendant, having, denied
that plintiff was a merchant, or was engaged in the grain bsiness, might
show that he was simply a gambler thereiq. Smith v. West. Union Tel.
CO., 280.
5. In construing a deed whose description is doubtful, the evidence
competent to be considered is the language of the deed and the surround-
ing circumstances at the time of its execution, including the situation of
the parties and the object they had in view. Elliott v. Gilchrist, 475.
6. In an action for a libel, expressed in ordinary language, witnesses
should not be allowed to testify as to the meaning which they understood
the libel to convey, or that they understood it to apply to the plaintiff
an offensive term found in the article. Gribble v. Pioneer Press Co., 794.
7. 1n assumpsit against a partnership a sealed instrument executed by
one partner may be admitted in evidence, not to prove the contract, but
the value of the goods, by showing what defendant had agreed to pay.
Gallagher v. Slrobridge Ltlwgraphfg Co., 475.
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8. Plaintiff claimed damages from a railroad company for preventing
the letting of his tenements by blasting near by. He was asked, "Could
you not have rented these tenements but for the railway? 2Hldd, a
proper question, calling for the witnesses' belief on a matter within his
own knowledge, and not calling for an opinion on a question of science or
skill. G. B. and L. By. v. Eagles, 405.
9. The certified copy of the registration poll-book of the precinct, kept
by a challenger, in which he checked off the names of all persons voting,
supported by his own testimony that the contents of the book were true,
is competent evidence to prove that persons named in an indictment as
having been falsely returned as voting, did not, in fact, vote. Owensv.
State, 679.
10. In a trial where defendant is charged with keeping open his shop
upon the Lord's Day (contrary to a statute), evidence that defendant was
aHebrew, who conscientiously believed that the seventh day ought to
be observed as the Sabbath, and that he actually refrained from secular
busihess on that day, is immaterial. Commonwealth v. Start, 407.
11. It is also incompetent for such defendant to p rove that lie kept his
shop open for the sole purpose of selling meat to Hebrews, and that this
'was a work of necessity or charity. Id.
12. In a suit for taxes paid under protest, it was shown by plaintiff that
enclosed withl his check was a protest, and the treasurer acknowledged
both check and protest. A copy of the protestwvasput in evidence 'without
notice to produce the original. He/d, the protest being a mere notice, it
was not necessary to produce the original. Mich..L. and I Co. v. Town-
ship of 1ephlc, 405.
13. The name F. WV. was printed by mistake upon ballots instead of B.
"W., the correct name, and when the mistake was discovered, duri~g the
election, it was corrected by writing E instead of "F" upon the re-
maining ballots. H eld, that the facts that the printer knew that B. W.
was the candidate, but thought his name was "F. WV.," and both "B,.
W." and "F.W."' ballots were cast by members of the "E,. Y. party,
and that those who voted "F. WV." ballots thought that that was "B.
W .'s" name, and that there was no "F. -V." in the township eligible to
the office, were admissible in evidence to show for whom the "F. WV"
ballots had been cast, and that they should be counted f~r B. WV.
Wirmmer y. Eaton, 805.
14. A., suspected of murder, on being brought to the marshal of
police, was asked by him where he got the body that was taken by A. to
a certain place on a specified evening, and, being satisfied thst A. was
evading, the officer said to him : "You are not telling the trth." After-
wards, the officer being informed that A. wished to tell him all about the
crime, said to him :"Go on." .eld, That on A.'s trial for murder, his
confesion made under the circumstances to the officer, was admissible,
and did not contravene the rule prohibiting involuntary confessions.
.Poss w.State, 606.
15. The declaratioas of deceased persons, who were disinterested at the
time the declarations were made, in respect to the location of boundary
lines and corners of land, are competent evidence to prove such location,
if the deceased persons had opportunity to be informed in respect thereto.
Bet hea v. .Byrd, 272.
16. They are not evidence if the person who maakes them is still alive,
whether living in the jurisdiction or not, nor if made by one interested
at the time of making them, nor if made post litem motam. Id.
17. That the witness owned an adjoining tract of land does not make
him incompetent. 3d.
18. In an action by a bank against an endorser of promissory notes
to recover the amount of the notes, it is competent for the defendant to
p~rove by parol testimony that the notes were given by the maker in set-
tement of overdue notes held by the bank, some of which defendant had
INDEX.
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endorsed, and that the endorsements were made relying on the assurance
of the president of the bank, who managed the affair, thatthe maker was
to execute a bond and mortgage to secure the notes, and that the bank
would look to the maker and the security alone, and recourse would not
be had to the endorser. cake v. Pottsvile Bnk, 402.
19. Testimony of the endorser that he "would not have endorsed the
notes had it not been for the express stipulation that he should not be
liable thereon" is not admissible. Id.
20. In an action to recover a balance due on deposits, the cashier of de-
fendants testified to the manner of entering deposits in bank books and
customer's pass-book, and that it did not appear in the bank book that a
deposit, entered on a certain day in the customer's pass-book had been
entered in the bank book. He was then asked " If plaintiff really made
the deposit as he claims, on what theory, if any, can you account for its
not appearing on the books of the bank " and this, under objection, was
answered, "upon no other theory but that the teller put the money in his
pocket." Held, that the admission of this question was error, and judg-
ment for defendant reversed. Hteade v. (aro. .Nat. Bank of alumbial
336.
21. Greater latitude is allowed on cross-examination when the witness
is a party or unwilling; the range of cross-examination is within the
discretion of the court, and such discretion, unless it is abused, is not re-
viewable on error. Hanchea v. Kimbark, 124.
22. Where the declaration in an action on a policy of insurance alleges
that the consideration of the contract was the payment of a certain pre-
mium at once, and of future annual premiums, and the policy given in
evidence is expressed to be made "in consideration of the representations
made in the application of this policy," and of the sums paid and to be
paid for premiums, and the application contains no promise of the assured,
there is no variance. Pikniz Lye Ins. Co. v. Baddin, 276.
EXECUTOR. See AssETs, 1. COmaissSIoNs, 1. PownR OF SA.=E, 1-5. WIT-
NEssES, 1.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
1. Executors who have, without warrant, had possession of testator's
realty, are chargeable with rents and profits, but these are not proper
items in the administrator's account, nor should credit be allowed them
therein for taxes, etc., with which the testator did not contemplate mak-
ing them chargeable. Welkers .Appeal, 541.
2. Such debits and credits might be allowed in such account where
they are not disputed, rights of creditors are not involved, and the parties
in interest agree. Id.
3. An executor will not be liable for the devastavit of his co-executor
because he joined in a receipt for the money wasted, where, with respect
to that part of the estate, no express trust duties were enjoined by the
will, and said executor, before consenting to the exercise of sole control
over the fund by his co-executor, took the advice of counsel and exacted
of him an acknowledgment of his sole liability, which lie had no reason
to doubt was good because of the financial responsibility of the co-exec-
utor. Wilson's Appeal, 476.
4. Where the creditor of an estate had been dead for two years at the
time the administrator alleged in his account that he had paid his claim,
and the claim had not been assigned, nor had the claimant gone through
bankruptcy, and no letters had, prior to the alleged dateofpavment, been
taken out on his estate, the administrator and his surety are liable to the
personal representative of the claimant for the full amount, with interest,
although the administrator bad been allowed credit in the final settle-
ment of the estate. Williamson v. Wlhitington, 541.
i. A testator, in foreclosure proceedings, bid in the property, and died
before completing the arrangements. Hedd, that his executors, who acted
INDEX.
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in good faith, with reasonable prudence. and under the advice of coun-
sel, might pay the amount of the bid, without suit. -Denton v. Sanford,
194.
6. Where they paid the purchase-money and took a deed before quali-
fying, and, after doing so, ratified these acts, they were not guilty of a de-
vastavit. Id.
EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT. See MANDAMUS, 1.
EXPELLED MEMBERS. See BENEPiT SocIESxm, 1.
EXTRADITION.
1. Apart from treaties, there is no obligation on an independent nation
to surrender a fugitive from justice. United States v. 1?auscher, 218.
2. Extradition must be negotiated through the Federal, not the State,
government. Id.
3. A defendant who was charged with murder on board an American
vessel on the high seas, fled to England, and his surrender was demanded
under the "Ashburton Treaty" of 1842. Upon his surrender he was not
tried for murder, but for a minor offence not included in the treaty. Meld,
(1) the treaty was part of the law of the land which governs all courts;
(2) defendant could be tried for murder only; (3) lie had the right to
exemption from trial for any other oflence until he had an opportunity
to return to the country whence lie was taken. Id.
4. Where a defendant in a state court pleads that he has been brought
from a foreign country by proceedings in violation of a treaty, and the
court decides against him, the Supreme Court of the United States can
review the judgment. Ker v. Illinois, 192.
5. But where a prisoner has been kidnapped, such court can give no re-
lief. Id.
6. Treaties of extradition only provide that forcertain crimes the fugi-
tive shall be deprived of the right of asylum, and prescribe the mode of
doing this. Id.
7. The tresp:ass of a kidnapper can be punished by proceedings against
him by the government whose law lie violates, or by the injured party.
Id.
8. How far such forcible transfer of the defendant may be set up
against the right to try him is for the state only to decide. Id.
FACT, QUESTION OF.
Where A., a bank, discounted, two notes for B., and after its insolvency,
its receiver sued B. on these notes, and also on a balance shown by the
books, and B. contended that these notes were paid by a check deposited
by him, and plaintiff denied this, the question of payment as a matter of
fact was left to the jury. Lingenfdter v. Williams, 543.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT. See CnnwAL. LAw, 8.
FEE IN STREETS. See SmExS, 1.
FELLOW-SERVANT. See MASTER &,srD SxnvA=, 3,4.
A., a 'longshoreman, in the employ of a steamship company, while
doing his work, was injured by the falling of a tub of coal, the hoisting
rope of which broke. The rope had heen furnished by B., also in theemploy of the same comp)any who had charge of the tackle, r pe, etc.
Whether B. was a fellow-servant of A., f'r whose actq the company was
irresponsible, was left to the jury. Canard S.. teamship C. v. Caney, 125.
FORCIBLE ENTRY.Where a prosecutor found the defendant standing on his property clear-
ing a ditch that separated it from the adjoining premie , and upon his
ordering him to leave, he chased the prosecutor to within a short dis-
tance of his house, the evidence is udffcient to warrant a verdict of guilty
of forcible entry. State v. Talbot, 476.
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FOREIGN INSURANCE COMPANY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8.
FRANCHISE. See CAUsE Or ACTION, 5. LEGISLATIVE GRANcT, 1.
Where a franchise is of such a character as to render both an expendi-
ture of money and the application of business judgment and skillrin its
management not necessary to make it useful and profitable, its value must
be determined by a consideration of it in connection with such possibil-
ities. Sullivan v. Lear, 744.
FRAUD. See ASsIGNMENT FOR CREDrroR S, 4. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 5.
BAvms% 2, 22-24. CREDITons' BiLL, 1. HUSiBAND AND WIJP, 1-3. IN-
PANT, 2. LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1, 3. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY, 1.
1. A person obtaining property by fraud acquires no title to it, but it is
held by him and all persons claiming under him, with notice, in trust for
the original owner. Third .Nat. Bank of St. Paul v. Stillwater Gas Co.,
253.
2. Equity will follow money or property through any number of trans-
actions, and preserve it for the owner. Id.
3. Although the relation between a bank and its depositor is merely
that of debtor and creditor, yet the fund does not change its character
from the fact that the money has been deposited in bank to the credit of
the depositor. If the money in his hands was impressed with a trust in
favor of another, the deposit will remain subject to the same trust. Id.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.
1. A bank made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, February 16,
1882. On March 2, 1880, it had conveyed a tract of land to W., one of
its directors, and on February 11, 1882, another tract. The consideration
of both deeds was the surrender to the bank by W. of shares of its capi-
tal stock held by him, the market value of which was more than the fair
price of the land. At the time of these transfers, the bank was insolvent,
and V., who had been a director since 1874, had heard rumors as to its
unsoundness. Held, the transfers were void; that W. was a trustee, and
the rumors were sufficient to put him upon inquiry. .oan v. Winn, 537.
2. A father, who wai largely in debt, and harassed by creditors, con-
veyed to his son, who lived with him, and was possessed of limited means,
land, by a deed acknowledged and recorded more than a year after its
execution, for the expressed consideration of $3,000, payable $500 cash,
$500 on demand, and the balance in annual payments of $500 each, re-
serving no lien for the deferred payments, and following the conveyance
by no change in the occupancy of the property. The evidence showed
the express consideration to be both inadequate and not bona fide. Held,
the conveyance was fraudulent and void as to the father's creditors. Hick-
man's Executors v. Trout, 679.
GAMBLING. See CONTRACT, 4, 5. EIvrDEN cE, 4.
A device known as a "bucket shop," which is in fact merely a wager
on the market price of grain at some specified time in the future, is a
species of gambling, and illegal and contrary to public policy. Smith v.
West. Union Td. Co., 279.
GARNISHMENT. See ATTORNEY AND CIIENT, 4. BANKs, 3. EQu12TY,
5, 6. TRUSTEE P.Rocss, 1.
GIFTS INTER VIVOS.
1. A gift of personal property from father to son, to be valid, must be
accompanied by delivery, and the delivery must be actual, so far as the
subject of the gift, in its nature, is capable of a delivery. 3ledloc v. Powell,
476.
2. A deposit of money in a bank in the name of another, subject to the
right of the depositor to take the income during his life, to which ar-
rangenment the donee assents, constitutes a valid gift inter vivos, if the
donor intended it as a present gift, though he retains the bank book.
Smith v. Ossipee Valley Ten-cent Say. Bank, 537.
VOL. XXXV.-105
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3. A father set apart certain United States bonds as a gift to his daugh.
ter. They were never delivered to her, but remained in the possession
and control of the father, with whom they were left at her request and
with his assent for safe-keeping. He collected and transmitted to her the
accruing interest on the bonds up to a certain date. but thereafter, and
without her knowledge, authority, orconsent, invested the bonds in a busi-
ness in which he had become interested. He then wrote to his daughter
a letter, which by his direction was duly stamped as a contract, in which
lie promised, if she did not elect to accept the investment in lieu of the
bonds, he would retain it himself, and pay her $!,000 with interest. She
accepted the written promise in lieu of the bonds, and upon her father's
death, brought an action on the promise against his representatives to re-
cover the $2,000. Hdd, (1) there was no consideration for the promise;
(2) the transaction was not a valid gift inter vitos; (3) there was no
valid declaration of trust of the bonds in favor of the daughter. Flanders
v. Blandy, 581.
GRANT. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 2. DEED, 1.
GUARANTEE. See Commox CARRIERs, 9. PAY- xT, 1, 3. SURETY-"SIP, 1.
GUARANTOR.
Diligence required to hold assignor or guarantor, 129, 201.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
In making a loan of his ward's money, a guardian should use the same
circumspection and prudence that a man would in investing his o,vn.
Bretcer v. Ernest, 405.
HIGHWAYS. See Mu.Nici, AT CORPOrATiox, 1, 5, 9, 10, 11, 14.
HOMICIDE. See CRm AL LAw, 13, 17. NEW TRIAL, 1.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See MARRIAGE, 1, 3,4. M tOTGAGE, 4. TRUs-
TEE PROCESS, 1. WrrNrss, 2.
1. A deed of conveyance of real estate, executed by the husband direct
to his wife, in the absence of fraud, and when neither the rights of cred-
itors or subsequent purchasers i ntervene, will convey to her such real
estate without the intervention of atrute. Furrow v. Athey, 542.
2. Where a wifeengages in business, the husband has a riglit, as against
his creditors, to work for her without compensation, and they cannot
charge her property with his debts on the ground that the relation be-
tween her and her husband is a fraud on them. -King v. Voos et al., 246.
3. Where an insolvent opened a store and carried on business in the
name of his wife, who signed for goods purchased certain notes subse-
quently paid with the proceeds of the busines, but was not further
known in the business, it was held that the obvious use of the wife's
name was for the purpose of defrauding creditors, and there was no error
in refusing to submit the case to the jury. .Blum v.Ross, 778.
ICE. See RiPAIxaAN RIGHTS, 3,4.
ILLEGAL BUSINESS. See EVIDENCE, 4.
A telegraph company cannot be required to communicate message
which is to furnish the means of carrying on an illegal business-as to
furnish the keeper of a "bucket shop" with quotations. Smith v. West.
Union Td. Co., 279.
ILLEGAL COMBINATIONS. See CAUSE OE AcTion, 6-9.
IMPLIED ASSENT. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 9.
IMPLIED COVENANT. See DEDicATIoN, 1.
The statutory right common to all owners of real estate in Philadel-
phia, to use division walls as party walls, does not constitute a breach of
INDEX.
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covenant of quiet enjoyment implied in a lease; and if a leased dwelling-
house is rendered unhabitable by the adjoining owner exercising his
right to pull down and rebuild the party-wall, such fact will constitute
no defence to an action for rent. Barnes v. Wilson, 475.
INDEMNITY. See AcTioN, 1. PROMISSORY NoTE, 2.
INDIVIDUAL CREDITOR. See PALTNERSHIP, 2, 3.
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY. See SHAEHOLDE rS, 1--3.
INFANT.
1. An infant sold a property, received the price agreed upon, and gave
a written obligation to make a deed when he came of age; his father
also gave the purchaser a written obligation that the son would make a
deed when he came of age. In an action of ejectment by the minor, it
was held that the plaintiff was not obliged, in order to maintain the
action, to allege a return of the consideration, or inability to return it.
Clark v. Tate, 679.
2. Where money is paid by a minor in consideration of being admitted
as a partner in the business of an adult, and he does become and remain
a partner for agiven time, hecannot, on voluntarily withdrawing from the
partnership, receive back the money thus paid, unless he was induced to
enter the partnership by the fraudulent representation of the adult.
Adams v. Beall, 710.
3. A contract of a personal nature may be avoided by a minor either
before or after his majority. .d.
INJUNCTION. See BAwxs, 32. CONTRACT, 9-11. NUISAcE, 1, 2.
INJURY. See A xAws, 1.
INJURIES TO PROPERTY.
Where the owner of land which has been injured by the rising of a
mill-dam, has acquiesced in such rising, lie cannot afterwards institute
proceedings to compel its taking down, but may recover damages for its
injury. Blake v. Cornwell, 480.
INNOCENT PURCHASER. See EsTorr , 1.
IN PBRSONAM. See LiEN, 2.
IN REM. See LIE, 2.
INSANITY. See CRurnAL LAW, 5.
INSOLVENCY. See BAxoKs, 20, 21. CEDrron 's BLL, 2. HusnsArD AwD
WIFE, 3.
Where certain stocks of an insolvent corporation are, for the time, un-
merchantable, and, if forced upon the market, would be sacrificed, the
court may, if it be desirable, to close the receivership, direct such securi-
ties to be sold at public auction, after full nptice to all persons interested,
at an upset price, and in proper lots to invite buyers. In re Newark Sav,
Inst. 474.
INSTRUCTION TO JURY. See Juny, 2. PERsoA. ITu=Es, 1. PRomr-
ISSORY NOTE, 5.
INSURANCE. See PpnmiPAL AND AGENT, 1.
INSURANCE (FreE).
1. Where live stock is described in a policy, to which is attached a clause
of indemnity against lightning, as "contained in" a building, such de-
scription is not a contract or warranty that the stock will be kept all tile
time in that building, or that the insurance shall cease when the stock is
away from the building. The insurance is recoverable when the stock is
INDEX.
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killed by lightning while pasturing in an adjoining field. Haus v. Fire
Asso. of Phila. Co., 60.
2. One in possession under a. contract to purchase, who has made par-
tial payments, has an insurable interest. Grange Mil Co. v. West. Ass.
Co., 125.
3. In equity, as between vendor and vendee, the insurance-money
should be paid to the vendor to the extent of the unpaid purchase-
money. Id.
4. As between mortgagor and mortgagee, the insurance-money should
go to the former to the extent of his interest. -1d.
5. Where a policy contained provisions that suit must be brought
within six months next succeeding the day upon which the loss occurred,
and that the company should have sixty days, after receipt of proof, topay the loss, he/d, that the latter provision did not extend the former, and
that the provision limiting the time within which suit should be brought
to a period less than that allowed by the statute of limitations was valid.
Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wels, 806.
6. A contract of insurance made for a period of years upon a mill build-
ing and machinery, while the. process of construction was known to be
ttill incomplete and going on, is applicable to the property when com-
plete, as contemplated by the parties. _A description of the property as a
'"tsaw-mill building" did not restrict the use to the purpose of a saw-mill.
Frost's D)etroit .L., &c., Works v. Mfiller's, &c., C. .21!. as. Co., 744.
INSURANOE (LIFE).
7. A., an old woman, lived with her daughter and B., the father of her
son-sn-law. B. had his life insured, and stated his interest in the appli-
cation as "has kept her for a certain length of time, and promises to keep
her as long as she lives." .Tld, tlat it could not be held, as matter of
law, that the insurance was speculative. .Batdorf'v. _Fehier, 476.
8. A policy was issued upon the lie of A. for the benefit of his mother,
who, together with Ak.'s sister, furnished the money to pay the first lpre-
mium. A. was then unmarried. After several premiums had been paid,
A., who had married, surrendered the policy (which had been in his pos-
session all the time, although he had shown it io his mother and told her
that it had been taken out for her benefit), and without the knowledge of
A.'s mother. A& new one was issued payable to his wife, it being stated
that the new one was a continuation of the old. Under the terms of the
policy, after two premiums had been paid, certain valuable rights under
it accrued to the person for whose benefit it had been taken out. .Held,
upon A's death, that a trust had been created in favor of the mother, and
that A., not having reserved a power of revocation in the first policy, a
transfer to the wife could not he made without the consent of themother.
Pingre v. Kat..Life las. Co., 477.
9. M., a minor, and deserter from the army, was shot by the sh~eriff who
attempted to arrest him. Whether the sheriff'knew the person shot was
a deserter, and whether the killing was in self defense, the evidence was
in conflict. Held, if the officer did not know that the person he fired at
was MI., and did not intend to kill Mf., it co,,ld not he said, as .matter of
lawv, that he lost his life by the design of the officer, within the meaning
of an accident policy insuring M., which provided that "the insurance
should not extend to any case of death or personal injury unless the
claimant establish that the death, etc., was caused by external violence
and accidental means, and was not the result of design, either on the part
of the deceased or any other person." Utter v. Trdrders' Ins. Co., 477.
10. Where the insured was killed, as above, it cannot be held, as mat-
ter of law, that he was engaged in an unlawful act, within the meaning of
the policy providing "when death or injury may have happened while
engaed in or in consequence of any unlawful act," no claim shall be
made. id.
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11. Answers in an application for life insurance, unless they are clearly
shown by the form of the contract to have been intended by both parties
to be warranties, are representations, and substantial truth in everything
material to the risk is all that is required. PlMonix Life .Ian. Co. v. .Raddin,
276.
12. Where a direct question is not answered at all, or imperfectly
answered, an issue of the policy without further inquiry is a waiver of
the want of an answer. Id.
13. A condition, upon which a policy was issued and accepted was "if
any of the declarations or statements made in the application * * * are
found in all respect untrue, the policy shall be null and void." A ques-
tion was "Has any application been made to this or any other company
for assurance upon the life of the party ? If so, with what result? What
amounts are now assured on the life of the party, and in what com-
panies?" And the answer was, "$10,000. Equitable Life Assurance So-
ciety." The answer was held to be a representation, and the issue of the
policy was a waiver of the right to require further answers. Id.
14. The acceptance of a premium, after the company knows of a breach
of a condition, is a waiver of a right to avoid the policy for that breach.
Id.
INSURANCE (MAnriEx).
15. Where one owner of a vessel agrees to procure insurance for two or
more owners and does so, in one policy and collects on it for a loss, any of
the other owners may sue for his portion of the money thus collected.
Gray v. Buck, 125.
INSURANCE MONEY. See TausT, 4-6.
INSURABLE INTEREST. See INsuuncff (LIE=), 7. (FiRE), 2-4.
INTENTION. See DEDICATION, 2, 3. GIFTs, LNTER Vivos, 2.
INTEREST. See UsuRY, 1.
INTERPRETER. See CmRnAL& LAW, 22.
INTOXICATION. See CONTRACT, 2.
INVESTMENT. See BANKs, 22. GUABDIAIN AND WARD, 1.
JOINT LIABILITY. See LANDLORD AND TENA NT, 2.
JURISDICTION. See A]XeIrRALTY, I. CnimznqA. LAW, 13-17. LIEN, 2.
STOCKHOLDERS, 1-3. UwniconPoRATzD SocIETIES, 1-3.
JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS. See ExTRADIT0 o,
4,5.
1. Action against any association under the National BankingAct may
be brought in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city
where such association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases.
First Nat. Bank of Tecurnseh v. Overman, 803,. Claflin v. Hoseman, 803.
2. If the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States does
not appear in some form on the face of the record the decree is erroneous,
and must be reversed. Peper v. Faordy e, 195.
3. Such court has no jurisdiction where it depends upon citizenship
alone, and citizens of the same State are plaintiff and defendant. Id.
4. The declaration of article 5 of the amendments to the constitution
that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise, infa-
mous, crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury," is
jurisdictional, and no court of the United States has authority to try a
prisoner without indictment or presentment in such case. "& parle
Bain, Jr., 433.
5. The indictment referred to is the presentation to the proper court,
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under oath, by the grandjury, duly impanelled, of a charge describing an
offence against the law for which the party charged may be punished. 1Ez
yarte Bain, Jr., 433.
6. When such indictment is filed with the court, no changecan bemade
in the body of the instrument by order of the court, or by the prosecuting
attorney, without a resubmission of the case to the grand jury, and the
fact that the court may deem the change immaterial, as striking out of
surplus words, makes no diffbrence. The instrument, as thus changed, is
no longer the indictment of the grand jury which presented it. Id.
7. Upon an indictment so changed, the court can proceed no further.
There is nothing in the language of the constitution which the prisoner
can "be held to answer." A trial on such indictment is void. There is
nothingto try. Id.
8. According to principles long settled in the United States Supreme
Court, its prisoner, who stands sentenced to the penitentiary on such
trial, is entitled to his discharge by writ of habeas corpus. Id.
JURY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LA W, 5. Cn-lAL. LAw, 3, 5, 11, 20-22.
FACT (QUESTION OF), 1. NEw TRIAL, 1-3.
. 1. Where a proposed juror, who was challenged for actual bias, stated
in his examination that he had formed an opinion on the subject of de-
fendant's guilt which it would require evidence to remove, but that he
could give him a fair trial, it was held, that in exclusion of questions by
defendant's counsel, designed to bring out the character and force of the
opinion, was error. People v. Brown, 542.
2. Where an artist has agreed to paint the portrait of the children and
fails to complete the work for several years, and the father, for whom it
was to be painted, refuses to accept it, in an action to recover the value
of the painting, it is error to make no reference to the delay on the
part of the plaintiff in completing the picture. Turner v. Mason, 404.
3. Where the only instruction to the jury, on a certain point, was
one asked for by plaintiff, he cannot complain on appeal that the
jury was not sufficiently instructed on that point. .Kdley v. Cable Co.,
629.
4. It is error to give the jury conflicting instructions based upon dif-
ferent views of the law without such instructions being harmonized by
the judge. Id.
5. Aninstruction that if the employer employed, as fellow-servants with
the injured employee men of usual competency and prudence in their
business, then defendant is not liable for their negligence, and the law
does not require defendant or his foreman to personally supervise such
men, but that he has a right to rely upon their discharging their duties
with proper care, is misleading, as suggesting that the employer might
be justified in neglecting his duties of supervision. Id.
6. Instructions which fail to adopt a rule of law to the conditions of
the case at bar are erroneons. City of Elgin v. Betkwith, 344.
KIDNAPPING. See EXTRAzniOw, 7.
LABOR COMBINATIONS. See CAUSE or AcTioN, 6-9.
LAND. See DAMAGES, 2, 3. DEDIcATIoN, 2,3.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See WASTE, 1.
1. Where one in possession under a claim of title is induced to accept
a lease through the misrepresentations, fraud, or trick of the lessor, or by
the mutual mistake of both parties, the tenant is not estopped from set-
ting up a superior title to that of his lessor. Bernidge v. Glassey, 277.
2. Where the owner leased a defective wharf, knowing its condition, to
a tenant who did not know its condition, but subsequently became
acquainted with it and continued to use it, one who is injured upon the
premises can hold landlord and tenant jointly liable. Joyce v. Martin,
806.
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3. Where, in a lien clause in a lease, a lessor agreed that in default of
paying rent, or in case of seizure of his goods under execution, the lien
should be enforced against all the goods on the premises as if the lease
was a chattel mortgage, and it was stipulated that the lessee should re-
main in possession and use the goods in his business, the said clause is
fraudulent on its face s to creditors, and therefore void as to an assignee
of the lessee. Reynolds v. Ells, 60.
4. Things belonging to a third person, which are on the demised
premises for the purpase of being wrought up or manufactured by the
tenant in the way of his trade, are not privileged from distress by the
landlord, unless they have been sent or delivered by such third person to
the tenant for that purpose. Clarke v. Milwall Dock Co., 147.
5. In a lease of a foundry adjoining the lessor's rolling mill, in which
the boilers were heated over the furnaces, together with the yard space,
joint use of pattern shop and engine room, in which were engine and
machinery, but no boiler, a covenant that the lessee "shall pay fifteen
cents per hour for the steam furnished to his engine," does not, without
more, impose upon the lessor an obligation to furnish steam. It is merely
a covenant that if lessor furnishes steam, and the lessee uses it. he shall
pay at such rate; it would be otherwise if furnishing steam was an inci-
dent to a lease of the premises. Penn Iron Qo. v. Dillon, 60.
LAND RELICTED. See WATERS AND WATFR-CouRsES, 7-13.
LEASE. See I-pLiED CovzAERT, 1. LANDLORD AwD TExAr, 3, 5,
WASTE, 1.
1. A lease for a year may be so drawn as to cover the part of the term
already expired as well as that unexpired. Palmer v. 0Jheseboro, 744.
2. A lease of the first floor of a building includes the front wall of that
part of the building, as parcel of the leased premises, and gives the lessee
not merely a privilege or easement appurtenant to the building to use the
wall for certain purposes, such as putting out signs, but the right to the
exclusive use thereof. Lowell et al. v. Strahan, 716.
3. An agreement made by a lessee with a third, to allow the business
sign of the latter to remain upon the outside wall of the leased premises,
in consideration of an annual payment, is a license and not a lease, and
does not constitute a breach of a covenant against underletting. Id.
LEGACY.
Where a testator, having in the first clause of his will given a pecu-
niary legacy to his wife, to be paid to her in cash or bonds, at her option,
on t "of my estate," and in subsequent clauses made specific devises of the
greater part of his "real estate," but in disposing of his personal property
used the terms "my estate," it was held that the real estate specifically
devised was not chargeable with the payment of the pecuniary legacy to
his wife. Worth v. Worth, 200.
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POWERS. See RA .aoA Commis-
siox, 1, 2.
LEGISLATIVE GRANT.
A legislative grant of an exclusive right to supply water to a munici-
pality, through pipes and mains laid in its streets, and upon the condition
of the performance of the service by the grantee, is a grant of a franchise
vested in the state, in consideration of the performance of a public ser-
vice, and after performance by the grantee is a contract protected by the
Constitution of the U. S. against state legislation, and against provisions
in state constitutions to impair it. t. Tammany Water WWork v. e
Orleaas Water Work, 273.
LEGISLATURE. See MARRIAGE, 1, 3. STATUTEs, 2-7. PoLICE PowER
1-4.
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LIBEL. See EVIDENCE, 6.
1. A communication made by the proprietors of a commercial agency,
about the character and financial standing of a trader, is privileged when
made to those of its patrons who have a special interest in the informa-
tion. But this privilege does not extend to publications made to patrons
who have no such interest. King v. Patterson, 543.
2. The publication by such agency of a notification sheet, sent to all
subscribers, is not privileged. _d.
3. The damages recoverable for a false report are such as might reason-
ably have been foreseen as the probable consequences of the wrongful act,
and which are the results of such wrongful act, in the usual order of
things. Id.
LICENSE. See LEAsE, 2. NUISANCE, 1, 2. OYsTER BEDs, 1-3. PATENT,
1,2.
LIEN. See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 5. Commox CAEnnER, 6. LANDLORD
AND TENANT, 3. PARTNERSHIP, 2, 3.
1. A laundry company has no lien on articles laundried for its charges,
where it contracted to deliver them before payment., Wiles Laundry Co.
v. Haldo, 406.. 2. Thejibboom of a vessel towed by a steam tug in the Chicago River,
struck a building on the land, through the negligence of the tug, and
damaged it. A statute of Illinois gave a lien on the tug for the damage,
to be enforced by a suit in personam, against the owner, with an attach-
meat against thle tug, and a judgment in e-sonam against the owner and
the surety in a bond for her release. After bond for her release had been
given, i., claiming to he part owner of her, was denied the right to be
made defendant. Judgment was given against the owner and surety on
the bond without notice to the latter. Held (1), the cause of action was
not a maritime tort of which an admiralty court would have jurisdiction.
( 2) The state could create the lien. (3) Tie proceeding was not forbid-
en by the U. S. Constitution. (4) The judgment against the surety was
proper. (5) J. was not unlawfully denied a hearing. aohnon v. Chicago,
etc., 1Elevator Co., 191.
LIFE INSURANCE. See BILL or EXCETIONS, 1, 2. EViDENCF, 22.
LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE CONTACTS, 65.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 1. APPLICA-
TION OF PAMiENTS, 1. ASSOCIATIONS. 1. CERTIFICATE OF DEPosiT, 1.
DEPOsITs, 2. INSURANCE (FmiIE), 5. MARIiAGE, 5.
1. Where a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations in
force at the time the right to sue arose, and until the time of limitation
expired, the right to rely upon such statute as a defence is a vested right
that cannot be divested by a subsequent act of the legislature extending
the period of limitation. Mcaacke 0o. v. ilferca tile Trust Co.,.311.
2. A new promise must be clear and positive, and distinctly refer to
the debt sued on. It must be made to the party or his agent and not a
third person. Hussey v. Kirkman, 61.
3. An unqualified acknowledgment of a subsisting indebtedness, even
if nmade to a stranger is, in Maryland, sufficient to remove the bar of the
statute. Stewart v. Garrett and .Maus, 61.
LITERARY PROPERTY.
A professor in a university orally delivering class-room lectures of his
own composition, does not so communicate them to the public as to entitle
any one to republish them without his permission. Caird v. Sime, 754.
LIVE STOCK. See INSunAxCE (FE), 1.
LIVERY-STABLE KEEPER. See BAILMENT, 1, 2.
LOAN. See BAws, 26. PArTNERSHiP, 1. RATImCATION, 1. SALE, 3.
INDEX.
MANAGERS. See BAxs, 18, 19.
'IANDAMUS. See BmNEFIT-SociE'rm, 1. ELTO'm xs, 1. RAIL-RoADs, 14.
ScHooL LAw, 1.
Where the marks over the name of a candidate upon a ballot were
such as to call for an exercise of judgment by the inspector as to whether
it had been scratched or it was the intention of the person casting it to
vote for the candidate, this exercise of judgment will not be controlled
by mandamus. State ex rel. Lilienthal v. Deane, 275.
MAINTENANCE. See CHAE pILTY, 1.
MAJORITY. See COsPORATIOnS, 8.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. See PnOBABLE CAUSE, 1, 2.
MARITIME TORT. See Lnty, 2.
MARRIAGE.
1. The mutual present assent to immediate marriage by persons capa-
ble of assuming that relation is sufficient to constitute marriage at coin-mon law, and such marriage will be sustained in Kansas, where its vnlid-
ity is directly drawn in question. State v. WIalker et at., 455.
2. The legislature has full power, not to prohibit, but to prescribe rea-
sonable regulations relating to marriage, and penalties against those who
solemnize or contract marriage contrary to statutory command. Id.
3. Punishment may be inflicted upon those who enter the marriage
relation in disregard of thle prescribed statutory requirements, without
rendering the marriage void. id.
4. Ak husband deserted his first wife and married a second. Some time
after his second marriage, his first wife procured a divorce from him on
the ground of desertion. The man and his second wife, who knewv noth-
ing of the first marriage and supposed that she was a lawful wife, lived
together after the divorce, and until the husband's death, and had several
children. .eld, the second marriage was void; that the continued co-
habitation and dwelling together as husband and wife, after thle divorce,
did not raise a presumption of marriage, and the children wvere illegiti-
mate. cxartwnight v. _McGowan, 606.
5. The husband's legitimate heirs having brought a bill for partition of
land seventeen years after his death, it was held that defendant's posses-
sion, who held under a child by its second marriage, was not a possession
under cover of title, and the statute of limitations was not a defence. Id.
MARRIED WOMEN. See DAAIAGRS, 5.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See FE-LLOW-SERvANT, 1. JURY, 5. PATENT,
1, 2. PRSONAL INJURIES, 1.
1. Ak driver of a horse railroad car is still the servant of the company
after he has given up the reins to his substitute, who ordinarily takes his
place to allow him to go to his meals. Gnonwea/tk v. Broeton ,S. . .,
343.
2 Drunkenness of a servant on the employer's premises, although it
does not incapacitate him or cause him to fail in his duty, is sufficient
cause for dismissal. .Bass Furnace Cb. V. Glasscock, 543.
3. Where a gas company by negligence permits the escape of gas into
a room and knows of such escape and the danger of inhaling the gas,
and orders a servant to work in the room, and he in obedience does s,,
without knowledge of his danger, and is injured, his master is responsi-
ble. C'izen.4' Gas.Light Co. v. OX2 riea 126.
4. The liabi'ity of railroad companies for injuries caused to their serv-
ants by the carelessness of other employees who are placed in authority
and control over them, is fouuded upon considerations of public policy,
and it is not competent for such companies to stipulate with its employees
as the time, and as part of their contract of employment, that such liabl-
ity shall not attach. Lake ,Shore & .Afieldgaa S. .Ry. v. Span gler, 41.
VoL. XXXV.-106
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5. Where a contract of hiring is made for a time certain, at monthly
wages, and the servant is tortiously discharged before the expiration of
the period of hiring, he cannot immediately recover the entire amount
of wages under the contract, both earned and unearned, but he may
recover the wages earned, and by doing so is not estopped from bringing
an action after the expiration of the period of hiring, to recover the
wages he was prevented from earning. Arnott v. Wathen .fason ffg. Co.,
592.
6. The duty to furnish safe machinery does not require that the ma-
chinery shall be the best and latest improved of its kind, but only that it
shall be reasonably safe. .Hickiy v. Tariffe, 726.
7. Where an employee has knowledge of the position, character, and
danger of the machinery, he assumes the risks incident to the employ-
ment. Id.
8. Where a girl, between fourteen and fifteen years old, was employed
in a laundry to feed collars to an ironing machine, and, about six weeks
after she began to work, caught her finger in the button-hole of a col-
lar, and had her hand drawn between the rollers and hurt, and it ap-
peared that, although she had not been instructed, she fully appreciated
the danger of the machine, the employer was held not liable. Id.
9. An employee demanded an increase of wages, to begin January 1st,
and gave notice that he would leave unless his demand was granted.
Master's agent promised to give an answer in a few days, but did not do
so for several, duringwhich time the employee continued to work. The in-
crease was finally granted, but the servant was told that it would begin not
January 1st, but May 1st. Held, the agent's silence did not raise the im-
plication of assent on the part of the master, and the increase began only
May 1st. .aysor v. Berkeley Co. By. & L. Co., 474.
10. The owner of a building in process of construction is liable to a
carpenter, working on the roof, who is injured by the falling of the build-
ing caused by the walls being negligently made of insufficient thickness.
Giles v. Diamond State Iron Co., 340.
11. Such carpenter is not bound to inspect the condition of the walls,
and does not take the risk of their insufficiency. Id.
12. If such building is capable of standing an ordinary storm, the fact
that it does not stand an extraordinary storm does not show negligence.
Id.
13. Its falling is primafame evidence of defective construction, and the
burden of proof is on the owner to show that this occurred by causes be-
yond his control. Id.
14. Where a city ordinance regulates the thickness of the walls of
buildings, the violation of such ordinance is prima facie evidence of neg-
ligence. Id.
15.-A city ordinance regulating the thickness of the walls of "buildings
having truss roofs, such as churches, public halls, theatres, and the like,"
includes a factory. .ld.
MEDIU M. See UxhuE INFLuExCE, 1.
MERCANTILE AGENCY. See EQurzy, 2. LIBEL, 1-3.
MILITARY COURT. See C==AL Lkw, 13-17.
MINES. See DowER, 1, 2.
MISDEMEANOR. See EvmIcE, 10, 11.
MISREPRESENTATION. See DEED, 4.
MISTAKE. See BAN.s, 2-24. LANDLORD AND TE AT, 1.
MISUSER. See CHAnTER, 1.
INDEX. 843
MORTGAGE. See B.Awx, 27. ExEcuToEs A,,T ADamNUSTRATORS, 5, 6.
RELEASE, 1. TRusAS, 4--6, 9, 10. WASTE, 2.
1. When a mortgagee who holds two mortgages, one of real and the
other of personal property, to secure the same debt, forecloses the per-
sonal mortgage, takes possession of the property, and converts it to his
own use, if its value exceeds the debt, there is payment, and there is n0
longer a subsisting debt to uphold the real mortgage. Bank v. McKinney,
125.
2. A mortgage on real estate, given to secure a debt, the amount and
terms of which sufficiently appear therein, is valid, and may be enforced,
although the note for the same debt is declared void because of a material
alteration therein made by the payee after the maker's death. Smith
v. Smith, 680.
3. Where A., who is the owner of a tract of land which is subject to a
mortgage, sells a part to B. who assumes and agrees to pay, as part of
the purchase price the amount of the mortgage, and then A. sells the rest
of the tract to C., C. or his assignee may, on the foreclosure of the mort-
gage, through the failure of B. to pay the same, and the sale of his lands
therefor, maintain an action against B. to recover damages; the value of
the land is the measure of damages. Wilcox v. Campbell, 607.
4. A., and B., his wife, were each seised in fee of one undivided half,
and A. gave C. a mortgage to secure payment of money advanced for im-
provements on the same, with a covenant that he was seised in fee of the
whole estate, B. joining to release dower, and all parties intending to
mortgage the whole estate, and when the facts were discovered B. gave 0.
a quit-claim deed of her half interest, taking from C. an instrumentof de-
feasance, which provided that, in case of sale, if half the proceeds was
sufficient to pay the indebtedness to C. half tle proceeds should be paid
to B., and if not, B. should receive 'the balance. Held, B. is entitled, in
case of sale, to the share of the proceeds provided by the contract and
her rights are not affected by a sheriff's sale of all the right in equity
which A. had in the mortgaged premises, although her contract of de-
feasance was not recorded. Union Sav. Bank v. Pool, 196.
MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE. See Imsu cmE (FntB), 2-4.
TRuSTs, 4-6.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. See CAUSE OF AcTino, 2, 3. EmiNENT
DoMn, 2, 3.
1. It is the duty of municipal corporations in New York to keep their
sidewalks clear of snow and ice. Taylor v. City of Yonkers, 404.
2. They may impose this duty upon citizens, and are not guilty of neg-
ligence, if, observing the work is being generally done, await their action
a reasonable time. Id.
3. After a reasonable time has been given, the corporation must either
compel the citizens to act or act itself. Id.
4. It is not negligence on the part of such corporation to fail to remove
ice formed by a sudden fall of temperature, and which it is practically
impossible to remove, or to fail to compel its citizens to sprinkle such ice
with aqhes or sand. Id.
5. Where a slope over a sidewalk, formed by sand and small stones, that
had washed out of an embankment from time to time, being allowed to
accumulate, became covered with sleet and ice, during a cold night, and
one going to his business early in the morning, fearing to go down the
steps of his house, attempted to walk over the slope, and was injured, it
was Add, that if the accident was caused by the ice alone, the city would
not be liable; but if the condition of the slope, which the city had negli-
gently allowed to be formed and remain over the walk, was a concurring
cause of the fall, without which the accident would not have happened,
it is liable. Id.
6. A conveyance of property to a city corporation, for an institute, "1in
trust for the uses and purposes, and subject to the limitations, powers and
INDEX.
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provisions"' expressed in a city ordinance on the subject, but containing
no other words of restriction or limitation on the right of alienation by
the grantee, vests an absolute fee simple title. Newbold v. Glenn, 677.
7. Where a property belonging to the city is sold at private sale for its
full value, and in the absence of fraud, the sale is valid, although the
statutory requirements nf notice, etc., were not complied with. Id.
8. A purchase by a city of land, outside its corporate limits, to use as
the site of a small-pox hospital, in lawful pursuance of a general statute,
authorizing the establishment of hospitals, will be regarded as such an
establishment of the hospital on the site in question. ti at the city can use
the property for said purpose without hindrance, although before such
use, and a few days after the purchase and conveyance to the city, an
amendment of said statute is enacted, providing that cities locating hos-
pitals outside their corporate limits must first obtain the consent of lhe
county court and board of supervisors. City of .Bichmond v. Supervisors of
learco Co, 404.
9. If a city or town instead of leaving the duty of keeping the high-
ways in repair to be performed by the officers and in the methods pro-
vided by the general laws, assumes to perform it by agents whom it may
direct and control, it may be held responsible for the acts of its agents.
Waldron v. ity of Haverhijl, 338.
10. Where one was injured by falling over a plank across a side-
walk, placed there by persons engaged in erecting a building, and the
accident occurred after dark of the first day the plank was there, the
city is not liable, as the obstruction had not existed a sufficient length
of time to charge it with notice. City of Warsaw v. Dunlap, 404.
11. Where a city is invested by charter with exclusive control of the
streets, the nature of the street improvements nmust be left largely to the
discretion of its authorities, and assessment may be levied for such im-
provements. .Murphy v. City of Peoria, 197.
12. Incorporated cities have power to establish water works for tlhe
benefit of the public, and the courts cannot interfere with the discretion
of the authorities in this matter except to control its abuse. Warren v.
Chicago, 197.
13. When the water is brought in the usual way into the main pipe in
front of the lots, so that the connecting of the lots with it is all that re-
mains to be done, the corporation has discharged its duty, and t he laying
of lateral pipes is a matter of private concern; to require such pipes to
"ibe laid by the lot owners at their own expense, when not needed, is an
unauthorized invasion of private rights. Id.
14. Where a town made a contract for the improvement of its streets,
by which the contractor was to look to abutting property ownerq excln-
sively for his compensation, each party supposing thit the town had power
to m nAe such a contract, when in point of fact it had not, and the prop-
erty owner is not liable and the town refuses to pay, the contrictor, in a
suit against the town to allow him to remove all the improvements made
by him in the performance of his contract, may recover, as such corpo-
ration, obtaining property under a contract which it had no power to
make, cannot refuse compensation and retain the property. HAn v. T-s-
tees of Town of Bellevue, 339.
MURDER.
One who gives in malice, a wound, not in its nature fatal, but which,
being neglected or mismanaged, causes death, is guilty of murder; but
not, if it clearly appear that the deceased's own neglect and want of care,
and not the wound itself, was the sole cause of death. 0rurn v. State, 3638.
NATURAL OBJECTS. See BouxDAmES, 1.
NAVIGABLE STREAMS. See BouNDAas, 4. WATER A WATER-
Counss, 2-4.
INDEX.
N:,GLIGENOE. See ADMIRALTY, 1. BAILME-NT, 2. BANrxs, 5, 6, 18, 19.
C.tui.:l oi ACTION, 10. COMM'iON CARRIERS, 1-3. DA.MIAGES, 12, 13.
FELLOW-SERVANT, 1. Juuy, 5. LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2. MAS-
TER AND SERVANT, 3, 6-, 10-14. MUNICIrAL CORPORATION, 4, 5, 10.
PERSONAL INJUsEU , 1. POMInSSORY NOTES, 5. RAILnROADS, 2, 5, 6,
8,9.
1. Where a plaintiff had purchased a ticket to ride in a day parlor car
of defendants and had in het possession -rnd control a small reticule con-
taining valuables, which she left upon the window-sill of the car when
she alighted to get refreshments, and it was stolen, it was hedd that she
was guilty of negligence, and defendant was not liable. Whitney v. Pull-
man 'alace Gar (o., 366.
2. Whiere one, while standing up between the seats of an open horse
car, there being no unoccupied seats, was thrown down and injured in
con seqrence of the rapid driving of the car around a curve, an instruction
to the jury that plaintiff'mn-t prove that under all the circumstances in
the case she was in the use of due care, is proper and sufficient. Lapointe
v. Middlc. ex By., 343.
3. In an action for damages for negligence and unskillfulness of a
physician, the want of professional skill of the-defendant is put in issue,
andi the burden of proof is on the plaintii ]Hlzma v. ]Joy, 165.
4. Tlie prolper m,,de (if proving this is by showing that lie did not
exercise it; showing defendmt's general professional reputation is not
sullicient, and hence z witness cannot be asked what defendant's general
repttation for skillfu lness is. Id.
5. Tihe droping of an important word in the transmission of a tele-
grain is pri iafacid evidence of negligence, and will render a telegraph
compnv liable if there is no evidence to explain the act. Ayer v. West.
Unioa u'e. b., 744.
u. The Pullman Palace Car Company does not undertake to provide its
cars with safes or other receptacles in which to deposit baggage, wearing
apparel, money, jewelry, or other valuables, and hence is not liable for
the loss of vau ibe .jewelry stolen from a passenger, there being n) onis-
sion on the part of the company showt except the failure to providesuch
safe, and a forre to guard the car. It is only bnund to keep a reasonable
watch over the passenger and his property. Pidlnutn .Palace Car Co. v.
Gaylord, 512.
7. A. drove across a railroad crossing without stopping, but lookedand
listened. People who saw the train coming told him to "whip up," but
lie did not understand that the train was in sight, aiil thought they were
joking him -01i1t, his slow mule. There was no flag man, and tle view
of the train was obstructed by freight-cars on a siding. The evidencethat
no bell wai rung seemed to predominate. ie was struck and killed by-a
train two hours late, and running froni twenty-five to forty miles an hour.
HIMd, A. va- not guilty of contribotory negligence. Guggeaiari v. L. S.
& M. S. Rd., 478.
S. One cro-ing a track two hours after the schedule time of a train
is not bound to leav- his wagon and go to a point where lie can see when
the view is obstructed by cars; lie is only bound to look and listen care-
fully. id.
9. A railroad company must exercise due care in regard to given warn-
ing. ,.
10. It is not negligence per se for a train to be behind time; but, if it
is, it is bound to exercise greater care in giving warning. Id.
11. It is not negligence to leave freight-cars on a siding, but when the
view is cut olgby them, the company must exercise greater care in giving
warning. R.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. See DEPOSITS, 1, 2.
NEW TRIAL. See CRIM1INAL LAW, 11.
1. That the sheriff who had the jury in charge during their delibera-
INDEX.
NEW TRIAL.
tions in a trial for homicide, entered the complaint on which defendant
was arrested, and also testified as a witness for the prosecution, does not
justify a new trial. People v. Couldin 406.
2. A new trial will not be granted because theforeman of thejury kept
them out till two o'clock in the morning, and did not inform them that
the officer in charge conmmunicated to him at eleven o'clock the direcit n
of thejudge to permit tLejury to separate if they had not agred at that
hour. Spinney v. Bowman, 607.
3. Where the oath administered to a jury in a civil action i-4 not the
one prescribed by statute,yet is sufficient to cover the inquir- involve.l in
the pleadings, and plaintiff makes no objection, but proceeds to trial, and
there is a verdict against him, such irregularity is not ground for a new
trial. Objection should be made when the oath is administered. Seyinour
v. -ParneI 542.
NON-PAYMENT. See PRoMIzSSoRy NOTFs, 6, 7.
1. Notice of non-payment of a note endorsed by a partnership is suffl-
ciently served on the firm if sent through the post-office to what was its
p lace of business at the time when the note was given, in the absence of
nowledge on the part of the holder of removal. Importcre,.and 2"-aderd
-Nat. Ba-nk v. Slnw, 403.
2. Knowledge of removal is not to be inferred from knowle e that the
endorsers had failed nid assigned to onewho was winding .p their affairs
at the former place of business. Id.
.. Such notice would be sufficient to hold a member of tte:1irm even if
the holder knew that lie was absent, but had a residence in a neighboring
town. Id.
NON-SUIT. See CAusE OF ACTiox, 10.
NON-USER. See CnARTEn, 1.
NOTICE. See A-ssiG.mFNT FOR CREDITOnS. 3. BAEmS, 1. COM-MON CAR-
IEIts, 2. CORPORATION, 11-14. EVIDENCF, 12. FRAUD, 1. INSURANCE
(FIRE). 2-4. MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS, 10. NON-PAYMENT, 1-3.
Possj~ssioN As NoTIcE 1, 2. VENDOR AND VENDEE, 1.
NUISANCE. See CAUSE OF Acarow, 2, 3. DAWAGEs, 2,12.
1. The occupation of a street for a market, although licensed by city
councils, is a private as well as public nuisance. McDonald v. ity ofNewark, 279.
2. A city granting such license may be enjoined from authorizing such
use of a street, or taking pay for it. Jd.
3. One who, with full knowledge of the existence of a nuisance upon
real estate for which theowner would be li; ble, purchases t he reversionairy
intere t and receives the rents thereof, thereby voluntarily .ssmitmes th'e
responsibility of such nuisance. .?ieve v. GCrma & .L. -So., 478.
OBSTRUCTION TO NAVIGATION. See DAMA.E% 4.
OCCUPANT. See VENDOR AND VENDER, 1.
OFFICE.
A clerk in the office of the President of the United States, who is
also a clerk of a committee of Congress, and performs the duties of both
positions, is entitled to compensation allowed by law for each. U. S. v.
&iunders, 278.
OFFICER. Fee BAx1z, 1,18, 19. CoEPoRATIoN, 3, 5. Pnomisson NOTE,
3. RATLFICATIONw, 1.
OLEOMARGARINE
The manufacture of may be prohibited on grounds of public policy.
.Powell v. Commonwealth, 83.
INDEX.
OPINION. See EVimExC, 8.
ORDINARY CARE. See BANs, 20, 21.
OUTSIDE WALLS. See LEA-r 2.
OVERDRAFTS. See DEPOSI=r, 4.
OWNERSHIP. See PnsowAL PROPERTY, 1.
OYSTER BEDS.
1. The privilege of locating oyster lots is simply a license, revocable at
the pleasure of the legislature; it is not inheritable or assignable. Less
v. Muir, 200.
2. The oysters deposited by a licensee remain his personal property, but
the territory of the bed continues subject to the state. Id.
3. A non-resident of Maryland, whether he be an owner of land in the
state or not, is incapacitated from holding a lot for the planting of oys-
ters. Id.
PAL&CE-CAR CO. See NEGIGENCE, 1, 6.
PARENT AND CHILD.
A father cannot, in any way, relinquish or surrender to another the
custody of the person of his minor child, so as to deprive the mother of
such child, after the father's death, of her right to its custody and the
care of its education. State v. Reuff, 607.
PARTNERSHIP. See DEPosITS. 3, 4. EviDENcE, 7.
1. A. advanced money to B., to be used in his business, taking his notes
therefor, under an agreement that A. mightbecome an equal partner with
B., considering the sums advanced as contributions to the capital of the
firm, if, on further examination, A. should so desire, and B. carried on
the business as his own, drawing more than half the profits therefrom
and crediting A. on the hooks with interest on the notes, and A. seeing the
interest credited, claimed that he was a partner and should receive half
the profits but no interest, and B. still cnntinued to credit A. with inter-
est and to treat the business as entirely his own. In a suit on the notes,
it was Aeld that the court was justified in ruling that no partnership was
ever formed. Mforrill v. Spurr, 198.
2. A partnership may convey all its assets in payment of an individual
creditor of one of the members of the firm, even conveying it in trust
for that purpose, if there is no fraudulent intent in fact. Carver Gin and
Machin Co. v. Baannon, 785.
3. It is only through the lien a partner has in the partnership assets
that the firm creditors may secure a preference in the firm assets over the
individual creditors; but if the partner has destroyed or parted with that
lien the right of the firm creditors is lost. Id.
4. A copartnership may continue notwithstanding the destruction of
the agreement of association by the partners. Teas v. Woodruff, 680.
PARTY WALL. See IMPLIeD COVENANT, 1.
One who has the right to use the wall of an adjoining property by
agreement with the owner, of which agreement the subsequent owner of
such property has no knowledge or notice, has no right, as against such
subsequent owner, to use the wall without compensation. Appeal of
.Heimback, 272.
PAR VALUE. See STocx, 1.
PASSENGER. See Comnmox C~mnR, 4, 5, 6. NEGLiGENcE, 2, 6. RAI-
nom), 4, 7, 10, 11.
PATENT.
1. In the absence of any agreement, an employer is not entitled to let-
ters patent issued to an employee for an invention made while in the for-
mer's employ. Hapgood v. H=44, 127.
INDEX
PATENT.
2. A license which the employer may have had to use the invention
is not assignable to his trustees. Hapgood v. ieil, 127.
PAYMENT. See ATTOrNEY AND CLIENT, 2, 3. FACT, QUESTIo N OF, 1.
MORTGAGE, 1. PROfS0RY NOTE, 10.
1. A draft given in renewal of another valid and pre-existing draft, in
the absence of mutual intention to the contrary, operates as a suspension
only of the debt, and not as satisfaction until paid. Bellevile &.Bank
v. Bornman, 837.
2. The fact that the holder of the original draft, which was guaranteed
by three endorsers marked it "paidand cancelled" on receipt of the re-
newal draft, which was guaranteed by two only of the same endorsers, and
subsequently upon payment being made on account of the debt, credited
them on the renewal draft, is not sufficient to show an agreement between
the holder and one of the guarantors that the second raft was given in
payment of the first, where the guarantors' endorsement of the renewal
draft has become inoperative by reason of a breach of the condition sub-
ject to which it was made, and where the drawer of both drafts has be-
come insolvent. Id.
- 3. Where B., being neither a party nor holder, endorses a draft as
guarantor on condition that A. will also endorse it as co-guarantor, and
A. writes a separate contract providing that he will pay ihe draft if the
drawer and B. do not, the guaranty of B. fails to become operative and
B. is not liable at the suit of the payee who took the draft with notice of
the condition. Id.
PAYMENT BY MISTAKE. See BANKs, 25.
PAYMENT UNDER PROTEST. See EvDNcE, 12.
PENALTY. See CONTRACT, 12. DAxAGE, 9. JURISDICTION OF UNITED
STATES COURTS, 1.
PERFORMANCE. See CONTRACT, 8.
PERSONAL INTJRIES. See MASTER AND SERvAm, 3. RALROAD,;
8,9.
in a suit by an employee against his employer for injuries received by
reason of a defect in the machine upon which be worked, a request to
charge "that the making of such ordinary repairs as the machine re-
quired, and the keeping of it in order from day to day may be entrusted
to servants; and if the master employs competent servants for that pur-
pose, and supplies them with suitable means, the master performs his
duty," is rightly refused where there is evidence that the servants em-
ployed to repair the machine did not use due care in their repairs, or in
giving warning of danger. In such case it should be submitted to the
jury whetherthe defendant had exercised a reasonable supervision over
his servants and over the manner in which the machinery was kept in
repair. Bogers v. Ludlow .Mfg. Co., 329.
PERSONAL PROPERTY.
In an action by an administrator against his intestate's father to deter-
mine the ownership of horses, there was evidence that the intestate used
the team as his own for over a year, and that the father had originally
bought and paid for the team. Hdd, that the court rightly in.structed
the jury that "the possession of the team under a claim of ownership
was presumptive evidence of ownership, not conclusive, but sufficient
until proof was introduced to the contrary.' Trivorraw v. Trevorrow, 341.
PHYSICIAN. See NEGLIGENCE, 3, 4.
PLEADING.
A complaint upon an insurance policy alleging an express agreement
permitting the plaintiff to take additional insurance in any other corn-
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pany, which agreement the company promised to insert in the policy, but
failed to do so, and that, relying thereon, plaintiff did take out additional
insuranco, is in.ilicient upon demurrer where the policy provides that
such permission mus4 be endorsed thereon, because it does not show that,
if the agre-ment was made before the execution of the policy, the p ain-
tiff was induced to accept it without knowledge that the stipulation was
not inserted, and, if made after, it does not show that the assured hadl pre-
sented the policy to the company and requested the insertion of such
stipulation, or the company had notice of such additional insurance.
Barons v. 1one Ins. Co., 542.
PLEDGE.. See PRo-missoRY NOTE, 2, 5. SALP 3.
1. Monev received by a pledgee from a legal sale of the pledgebecomes
his own to the extent of his debt; the balance he holds as "money bad
and received" for the pledgor. Fletcher v. Harmon, 127.
2. Money received from an illegal sale, the pledgor, waiving the tort,
may require to be applied to his debt, and tle balance is mone-y received
for his use. 11.
3. The value of securities in pledge tortiously dealt with cannot, unless
reduced to the equivalent of money, be recovered as money had and re-
ceived, nor by set-off. d.
4. .contract touching a pledge to secure a debt is collateral, and dam-
ages for its breach cannot be allowed by recoupment. Id.
PLEDGOR AND PLEDGEE. See SALE, 3.
POLICE POWER. See OLEO.rLRGAR1Nr, 1.
1. An act prohibiting the manuflcture and sale of oleomargarine, and
keeping oftlue.ame for sale, falls within the powerof the general assembly
to legislate lor the public health. Powel v. Cor., 53.
2. The loss to indlividuals, etc., has no effect when the legislature has
declare.l that public safety requires such prohibition Id.
3. The fact that a prohibited substance in a pure state may be whole-
some, is irrelevant in ajudicial inqiry. Id.
4. The tc.t of tle reatsonableness of't police regulation, prohibiting the
making and selling of a particular article, is not alone whether it is un-
whlml.-oe and injurious, but whether it is of such a character that few
will eat it knowing its real chlracter; that it canl be imposed upon the
pulblic as an article of food'which is ia common use, and whether prohi-
bition is the only way to prevent its fraudulent substitution'for tie real
article. Id.
POSSESSION. See PERSONAL PROPERTY, 1.
POSSESSION AS NOTICE.
1. A. widow furnished her bachelor brother with $1,600, with which,
anl $500 advanced hv him to buy a farm for their joint use, the title to
be taken to both. The brother iook title to himself, and they lived upon
the place, he manaaing the land, and she the home. The deed was re-
cordel, and he mort-aged the land to secure a lo in, and appeared as
owner to the world for ten years, during which time tie sister did not
enforce her rights. ld, her posseson under such circumstances would
not charge a purchaser or sibmequent incumbrancer with notice of her
equilahle rights. Irarris v. .1rchitlre, 126.
2. For twelve Years the sister believed she owned an interest in the
land; then she filed a bill to declarea rculting trust, and to set aside t
conveyance by her brother to one who had notice of her equities, etc.
Held, thc delay was not too great.. Id.
POWERS. See B.,xN- 27.
POWER OF ATTORNEY. See STocm, 2.
A power of attorney authorizing the donee therein named to collect'all
VoL. XXXV.-1-07
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money due, or to become due, his principal on "rents, accounts, bonds
and toortgages, or otherwise," and to do all business with a particular bank
named in the power, in his principal's name, gives the attorney no au-
thority to draw money of his principal from another bank. Sim, v. U. S.
Trust Co., 189
POWER OF SALE.
1. Where a power to sell real estate is given in a will to several execu-
tors, a sale by the executor who qualifies, or the surviving executor, will
be valid, whether the power is discretionary or mandatory. .Ely v. Dix,
195.
2. *Where several persons are to participate in a fund to be raised by a
sale of real estate, by executors, under a power, the death of one bencliciary*
before the power is exercised, will not impair the right of the executors
to sell. Id.
. 3. An admr. c. t. a., can exceute any power conferred by the will on the
executor therein named. Council v. Arcrelle, 195.
4. As a general rule, where a will directs land to be sold, for division
among devisees, and designates no one to nake sale, neither an executor,
nor admr. c. t..a., can execute the power, but such power may be conferred
upon them, either by express words, or by reasonable implication from
the provisions of the will, Id.
. Ai executor can execute a power of sde, although not conferred
upon him expressly, where either or both realty and personalty are to be
sold, or debts or legacies are to be paid, or the executor is to have the
fund as executor. .d.
PRACTICE. See BANKS, 3.' .CAUSE OF AcTioN, 10. CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2,
4, 10. DAMAGES, 14. NEW TRIAL, 1, 2, 3. PRocEss, 1.
PREFERENCE. See AssIONET FOR CREDITORS, 1.
PREFERRED CLAIM. See TRusts, 7, 8.
PREFERRED STOCK. See DIVIDENDS, 2.
PREMEDITATION. See CRIMINAL LAiW, 9.
PRESENCE OF ACCUSED. See CRIMINAL LAW, 4.
PRESENTMENT. See PROMISSORY NOTE, 6, 7.
PRESUMPTION OF PAYMNENT.
Where an assignee of mortgages testifies that" the agreements relating
to the sale of the mortgages, and the assignment to him, were, while ill
his pos-ssion, eaten by rats, the fact that the dociuents were pla.ed
within the reach of rats, by a business man, will he held lilemiry proof
that they were of no other value than as food for rats, and the lresunp-
tion of .payment from lapse of time will prevail. Wan'd v. Greinolds,
607.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. See AOENT, 1. BANKS, 13, 1.4, 16, 17, 31.
o:x.MysssIoNS, 3, 4. CONTRAcT, 15, It6. 'owi n orA TrotNEY, 1. Pitom-
1iSORY NOTE, 8.
1. Where an insurancb agent, clothed with all apparent authority, re-
ceiveil de endant's note fora first premium, and agreed in writing with
him that, if unsatisfactory, lie might reject the policy, and the note would
be returned, both nnte and agreement constituted the contract, and, upon
the policy being rejected, the company canot sue on the note and claim
that their agent had no authority to nake the written agreement. Jaco-
wey v. German Ins. Qb., 806.
2. P., a collector in the employ of H., deposited in a bank, without H.'s
knowledge, money, and, in designating to whose order the same was to
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be payable, wrote in the bank register, "H., by P." The bank issued and
delivered to P. certificates of deposit, payable to the order of "H.," which
were paid by the bank upon the endor,-ement of P. of" H., by P." H.,
learning of the transaction, ratified the act of P. in depositing the money,
and sued the bank upon the certificates so paid. Held, there was no con-
tract that the certificates were payable only when endorsed according to
the signature in the register, and H. was entitled to recover. .lonig v.
Pacific Bank, 804.
3. A local freight agent of a railroad, having a right to issue bills of
lading, but only upon actual receipt of property for transportation, issued
bills of lading for sixty-four barrels of beans to W., describing them as
received to be forwarded to C., but adding, with reference to the packages,
that their contents were unknown. W. drew a draft on the consignee,
and procured the money upon it from plaintiff by transferring the bills
of lading as security. No barrels of beans were, in fact, received or
shipped by the railroad, and the bills of lading were in furtherance of a
conspiracy between V. and the freight agent to defraud. Held, that the
bank could recover damages from the railroad company for the fraud-
ulent issue of the bills of lading. Bank of Batavia v. .N'. Y., L. F. & W.
Bd., 573.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
A., a state treasurer, deposited with a bank state funds. The bank
executed a bond, with sureties, for the return of the money on demand.
Held, that A. could recover from the sureties on the insolvency of the
bank, and that the sureties were bound, no matter whether the bank re-
ceived the money honestly or by fraud. Harbisonv..Bailey, 56.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATON. See LwEL, 1-3.
PROBABLE CAUSE.
1..A passenger, on his return to S., offered a ticket marked from L. to
S. "and return," upon which he had ridden from L. to S. The conductor
refused the ticket and demanded fare. The conductor testified that the
passenger said he would get nothing but the ticket, and refused to leave
the train. The passenger, that lie supposed the ticket was good, and had
no money, but promised to pay when he arrived at S. The conductor
allowed him to ride to S., and there had him arrested for fraudulently
evading the payment of fare. Held, that there was s~ifficient evidence of
want of probable cause to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff. Xrulevitz v.
Eastern Rd., 196.
2. The conductor, who was also a railroad police officer, pointed to
laintiffand said, "that is the man," and told the local police to arrest
Em Held. that he ordered the arre.qt as conduclor and not as police
officer, and, it having been made by police who were not present when
the offence was committed, and without warrant, was not authorized by
statute. Id.
PROCESS.
A., a citizen of Missouri, was sued in that state by B., also a citizen, and,
while the suit was pending, A., at the request of his attorneys, went to
Illinois, to assist there in taking depositions, and. while there for that
purpose, was served with a summons in a suit by B, for the same cause
ot action. Held, lie was not exempt from service. Greer v. Young, 372.
PRODUCTION OF BOOKS, ETC. See RAILROAD COMMISSION, 1, 2.
PROFESSIONAL SKILL. See DAMAGES, 14.
PROMISSORY NOTES. See AGENT, 1. BANK, 2, 3, 7. BURDEN OF
PROOF, 1. CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT, 1. CORPORATION, 11-14. Es-
TOPPEL, 4. EVIDENCE, 18, 19. MORTGAGE, 2. Nox-PAYmuaxT, 1-3.
SUREYSHP, 1.
INDEX.
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1. One signing his name on the back of a piece of commercial paper, as
the cashier of a bank, cannot be heldassurety thereon, incase of its non-
payment, if he was, at the time of signing, duly authorized to sign as
such. State Nut. Bank v. Singer, 537.
2. Where A. endorses a note for P.'s accommodation, he cannot use an
indemnity against his liability for such endorsement-which was. a
security previoasly transferred to him by B.-as indemnity against an
entirely different liability; nor can A. confer on the holder of the ac-
commodation note any right to apply such security on that note. Ander-
son v. Sim, 539.
3. A promissory note. signed, "Independence Mfg. Co., B. I. Bron-
nell, Pres.." purporting to bind both signers, and having nothing on
its face to indicate that the last signer was president of the corpo-
ration, or had signed the note for it or on its behalf, binds the lastsigner personally; and the letters "Pres. " must be regarded simply as
descriptive of the person to whose signature they are appended. .Heff-
ner v. Brownell, 337.
4. In an action of debt on a note dated November 1, 1880, and given
for the purchase-money of a quantity of guano, the defendant filed a
plea of equitable set-off, the gravamen of which was an alleged breach of
contract by plaintiff in failing to deliver promptly the fertilizer, which
was to be transported to defendant on or before September 22, 1880. Held,
that defendant had waived the defence by executing his note after the
alleged breach. _peid v. Field, 338.
5. The payee of a promissory note, who has received from the maker
other notes as collateral security, is liable to the latter, on the col-
lateral notes only for failure to present them, and gives notice of non-
payment, and his liability extends only so far as the owner of the collat-
eral notes has been damaged by his negleet; and an instruction to the
jury that seems to hold that his duty is that of an endorser is erroneous.
Rennedy v. Rosier, 538.
6. A negotiable note, by its terms payable at a particular bank, must be
presented at that bank for payment, at its matwity to hold the endorser.
Peabody Ins. co. v. Wi.qon, 604.
7. If the endorser resides in the same place where the demand of pay-
ment was made, notice to him must be personal or left at his dwelling-
house; if at a different place, notice must be sent to him by the first mail
which leaves after the day of dishonor is past, directed to him at his resi-
dence, or nearest post-office, or post-office where he usually receives his
mail matter. Id.
8. A note payable to the order of an agent of a corporation (the prin-
cipal as well as the agent being specified by name) is, in legal effect, pay-
able to the corporation, and the principal, as well as the agent, can sue.
.Martirv. Lamb. 604.
9. If such suit is brought in the agent's name for the use of the princi-
pal, and the agent die, it may be prosecuted by the principal. Id.
10. A promissory note given for a det, and its renewals, merely extend
the credit, and do not, unless paid, discharge the debt. Fry v. Patterson,
675.
11. A promissory note, provided that "if default be made in the pay-
ment of the interest as above provided, then this note shall immediately
become due at the option of the holder thereof." -Held, the holder was
entitled only to a reasonable time after default in which to exercise his
option, and seven months was not a reasonable time. Orossmore v. Page,
675.
PROPERTY IN TRANSIT. See TAxATIoN, 1, 2.
PUBLICATION OF NOTICE
Publication of a notice on the third sheet, called the "supplement,"
and containing matter for which there was no room in the two sheets
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on which the paper was usually printed, is sufficient when it appears that
the so-called "supplement" is circulated co-extensively with the rest of
the paper. Lent v. Tkon, 544.
PUBLIC POLICY. See CONTRACT, 12. CORPORATION, 5, 6. GAuBL-IG,
1. ASTsR AND SERVANT, 4.
PURCHASE-MONEY. See CONTRACT, 17.
PURCHASER WITHOUT NOTICE. See PARTY WALL, 1.
QUO WARRANTO. See CHARTER, 1-3. STATUTE S, 2-7.
RAILROAD. See ComioN CARRIERS, 5, 6, 7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
4, 6. CONTRACT, 13, 14. DAMAGES, 2-7, 12, 13. DIVIDENDs,
2. EMINENT DoAiN, 2,3. MASTER AND SERVANT, 4. NEGLIGENCE,
1, 7-11. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 3. PROBABLE CAUSE, ], 2. STREET, 1.
1. A railroad corporation has practically the exclusive control of the
land within the lines of its location and the authority of removing there-
from all things growingthereon. .Hfaydin v. Skillings, 123.
2. It is the duty of railroad companies to have their stations for the
accommodation and safety of passengers, and they are liable for injuries
re-ulting from the want of such light, unless the passenger's negligence
contributed to the injury. Fordyce v. Men-ill, 744.
3. In anaction byan abutter to recover for injury to his premises caused
by an elevated road built in front of them, damages can be recovered on
account of the gas, smoke, steam, dust, cinders, ashes, and other unwhole-
some substances emitted from the locomotives. Lord v. .Metro. Elebated
Bd., 342.
4. When a railroad ticket has been purchased in good faith from an
agent acting within the general scope of his employment, it is the duty
of the several companies named therein to honor it until it is used or ex-
pires by its own limitation. Young v. Penna. Rd., 278.
5. Where a rilroad company sets fire to dry grass, negligently allowed
to accumulate on its right of way, and, without fault on the part of an
adjoining owner, permits such fire to escape to his land and destroy his
property, it is liable, whether the fire was negligently started in the first
instance or not. Indiana B. & W. By. v. Overman, 341.
6. Where in constructing a railroad, a portion of plaintifi's pasture
fence was remov.,d and a cut eight feet deep was made where the fence
had been into which the plaintiff's horse fell and was killed, the company
is not liable, as there was no obligation upon it to fence its tracks. Jones
v. We-tern . 0. Bd., 278.
7. A railroad company sold and delivered a thousand mile ticket to a
purchaser, who did not sign it, and was in ignorance of the following
condition: "Conductors will not honor thisticketunless properly stamped
and signed by the purchaser, and will strictly enforce this condition."
This ticket was several times honored by the conductors without requir-
ing the purchaser to sign the condition. Held, that the company waived
the requirement, and that on ejecting of the passenger for refusing then
to sign the ticket was not justifiable. Kent v.B. & O. Bd, 608.
8. At a place on a line of a railroad where, although notapublic high-
way, there is a crossing constantly and notoriously used as such by the
publi, without objection from the company, some reasonable notice and
warning must be given though it need not be by ringing a bell or blow-
ing a whistle. .Byrne V. N. Y. Cent. & H. B. By., 341.
9. Where one was injured by a train backing over such crossing, and
there was a dispute whether a bell was rung or other warning given,
the court is not bound to charge, as requested by defendant, that if the
bell was rung that was a sufficient warning, but may leave it for the jury
to say whether such notice or warning was given as was proper and rea-
sonable under the circumstances. Id.
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10. Where a passenger enters a train and pays his fare to a station on
the road, and before the journey is completed, the conductor tells him the
train does not go to that station and that he can either leave the train
where it is then stopping, or go on to some other point, and the passenger
leaves the train he has a right of action. But if, after he has left the
train, the conductor tenders him the fare for the uncompleted part of the
journey, and he accepts it, he waives his right of action. Florida S. Bd.
v. Ztz, 278.
11. A contract between a railroad and a sleeping-car company provided
that the latter should f, rnish cars for the transportation of passengers,
and that its employees should be governed by the rules and regulations
of the former. One of these was that, on certain trains, passengers should
not be entitled to purchase sleeping-car accommodati.,ns unless they held
"through-tickets." A passenger holding a "split ticket," who applied for
sleeping-car accommodations and was refused, was expelled from the
sleeping-car, its conductor assisting the train conductor; no special force
was used. He/d, lie could not recover against the sleeping-car company.
Laurence v. Pullman Palace (ar Co., 342.
12. The lessees of the purchasers of consolidated railroads at a fore-
closure sale are not bound by the stipulations in a contact between a
county and the companies, binding them to stop all trains at the depot at
the county-seat, although the consideration of the contract was the gift
by the county of large sums of money, and the vote of the money was con-
ditioned upon such passenger and freight accommodations. People v.
Louisvi/e & N. Rd., 342.
13. That the charter of the railroads authorized such contracts does not
add to the liability of the lessees. Id.
14. A railroad company, with a terminus at a county-seat, is vested
with discretion as to the points of location of its track and station in the
town, but when such discretion has been once exercised by the location of
its tracks, etc., and the stations have been maintained for thirteen years,
it cannot remove them, or refuse to stop its regular trains at smch stations;
its duty to do so may be enforced by mandamus. Id.
RAILROAD COMMISSION.
1. The Pacific Railway Commission, created under Act of March 3,
1887, is not a judicial body, but a mere board of inquiry. In re Petition
of the Pacfic Railway Commission, 621.
2. Such commission cannot call upon the U. S. courts to compel a
witness to answer questions and produce books, etc, relating to his pri-
vate affairs. Id.
RATIFICATION.
Wh.re the treasurer of a corporation improperly loaned its funds to
another corporation, of which he was also treasurer, and the former sued
the latter, and in good faith effected a settlement for a percentage, afternotifyig the treasurer and his sureties of their intention to do so, and
offering to assign the claim to them, provided they would pay the amount
due from the treasurer on account of such improper loan which was re-fused, and a receipt was given by plaintifof reserving its rights against thetreasurer and his sureties, it was ed, that the bringing of such suit did
not amount to a ratification of the treasurer's act in making the loan, andthat he was still li ble for the balance after deducting such percentge.
Goodyear Dental Vulanite Co. v. Cbu, 339.
REAL ESTATE. See LIACY, 1.
REAL ESTATE BROKER. See COMisSIOnSs, 2-4.
REA.LTY. See ExEcuToRS Aei' AacmtSBATORS, 1, 2.
REASONABLE CARE. See NF-GLIGEN'OE, 6.
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REASONABLE DOUBT. See CRnnmA LAw, 10.
REASONABLE TIME. See PRoMSSoRY NOTi, 11.
RECEIVER. See ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDIToRS, 4. INSoLVENCY, 1.
RELEASE. See WrrN~ss, 1.
A release of a mortgage in consideration of the mortgagor's quit-claim
deed of the lnd may be set aside when the deed does not include all the
land mortgaged, and the mortgagee was deceived in supposing it did,
without fault on his part. Elliott v. Gilchrist, 478.
RELIGIOUS EXERCISES. See SCHOOL LAw, 2-4.
REMAINDER. See WILL, 6.
REMEDY AT LAW. See EQuiTY, 1.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
The rule of taxation prescribed by Rev. Stat. U. S. 5,219, which pro-
vides that the taxation of shares of national banking associations "shall
not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in
the hands of individual citizens," is a federal question within the mean-
ing of the removal acts, and a cause, involving such question, may be re-
moved as though the same stattory provision has been enacted by a state.
Ricurds v. Town of Rock Rapid%, 538.
REPRESENTATION. See EsToPPEL, 4. INSURAwCE (LIFE), 11, 13.
RESCISSION. See CONTRACT, 17.
RESPONSIBILITY OF PRINCIPALS FOR THE MALICIOUS TORTS
OF AGENTS, 609.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE. See CONTRACT, 9-11.
REVERSAL. See CRIMINAL LAW, 11. ERROR, 1.
RIGHT OF ACTION. See DAeuGEs, 9. RAILROADS, 10.
RIGHT OF REAL ESTATE AND LOAN BROKERS TO COMMIS-
SIONS, 544.
RIPARIAN OWNER. See WATERS ANI WATER-CouptsE, 7-13.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
1. The owner of land bounded by an irrigating ditch, which he used
by parol permission, has no riparian rights to the flow of water in the
ditch, where it is an artificial and not a natural channel. Green v. Carotto,
480.
2. An action of tort cannot be maintained for passing over the shore and
flats below high-water mark, for fishing, where the shore has not been
enclosed by the proprietor, and the defendant has not created any per-
manent obstruction. Packer v. Ryder, 480.
3. The ice formed on an unnavigable stream belongs to the riparian
owner, and not the owner of a milldam, who has a qualified interest in
the water flowed. Stevens v. Kdley, 128. "
4. If the owner of such milldam mal;ciously and unnecessarily draws
the water from the streams and thus destroys the ice field, he is liable to
the riparian owner. Id.
RISKS OF EMPLOYMENT. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 6-8, 10-15.
REVISED STATUTES. See AmmIRnY, 1. BANxs, 27, 32, 33. OF-zCERS
1. REMOVAL OF CAUSE, 1.
SALARY. See CAusE OF ACTIOn, 4.
SALE. See CONTRACT, 17. MuliCzPA-L CORPORATION, 6, 7.
1. A., a dealer in diamonds, by his agent, delivered jewels to B., also a
dealer, and took from him a receipt, stating the value of the jewels, and
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that they were received " on approval, to show to my customers," and
"to be returned on demand" to A. B. sold them to C., who paid for
them in good faith. -eid, in an action by A. against C., that B. had
authority to sell them, and C. acquired a good title. Smith v. Clews, 407.
2. A vendor advertised for sale a tract of land, 300 or 400 acres of
timber land, and again as 400 acres of timber land. As there was no bil
for the land, the timber was offered at auction, and bought by C. The
tract was in fact only 218t acres; there were no fraudulent represen-
tation to C., and he, being an experienced lumberman, went upon the
tract before the purchase, and was shown all over it until he expressed
himself satisfied. -Held, that the contract of purchase was one of hazard
and that C. was not entitled to an abatement of the price because the land
did not contain 400 acres. Shoemaker v. CUe, 343.
3. A. obtained a letter of credit on B. agreeing to pledge him all goods
purchased on it, and authorizing B. to take possession, etc. A. entered
such goods at the custom house in his broker's name, who warehoused them,
and gave the receipt to A., who pledged the receipt to i. for a loan. B.
seized the goods, and IvL brought suit against him. Held, B having ad-
vanced his credit at A.'s request, and taken a bill of lading in his own
name, and relied upon the property for his reimbursement, was the owner
and not pledgee. His relation to A. was that of owner, under a contract
to sell and deliver when the price was paid. Moors v. Kidder, 676.
SALE OF LAND. See VENOR AND VExDE;, 2.
SATISFACTION. See PAix,;Ev, 1-3.
SAVINGS BANK. See BANKs, 18, 19.
SCHOOL DISTRICT.
Unexpended school money, apportioned to a district which has been
abolished, may be held by trustees appointed by the court for the benefit
of the district, and the maintenance or revival of the district organization
is unnecessary. School District v. City of Concord, 544.
SCHOOL LAW.
1. School trustees have authority to require that a reasonable time shall
be given to the study and practice of music in the public schools, and a
text-hook for that purpose provided by each pupil. Where apupil isex-
pelled for refusal to comply with such requirement, unless some good
cause be shown for such refusal, although made under his father's direc-
tion, mandamus will not lie to compel his reinstatement. State ex re.
Andrew. v. Webber, 319.
2. Where a statute has not prescribed any religious belief as a qualifi-
cation of a teacher in a public school, the school authorities may appoint
a teacler who belongs to any or no church. Millard v. Board of Educa-
tion, 198.
3. A bill in equity filed to enjoin a board of education from the use of
school fndsfor sectarian purposes, upon the ground that the teachersand
some scholars were required to attend Catholic religious services, was dis-
missed because it did not allege that the board of education were in any
manner connected with said exercises, nor that complainants had any
children who were required to attend. Id.
4. Where the people vote not to build a school-house, the board of edu-
cation, being required to keep school, may, without vote, lease a suitable
building. Id.
SCIENTER. See A.wxAI., 1.
SEALED INSTRUMENT. See EviDicE, 7.
SEASHORE. See RiPARxw RIGHTS, 2.
SERVANT. See BAnrtm=, 2.
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SERVICE OF WRIT. See PRocEss, 1.
SET-OFF. See DEPOSITS, 3. PLEDGE, 1-4. PRo~nss0Ay NOTE, 4.
SHAREHObDERS. See ASSocrATIONS, 1. TAxEs, 3.
SLEEPING-CAR COMPANY. See CoMMnON CARRIERS, 1-3,4.
If through want of due care on the part of such company the personal
effects of a passenger, such as he might reasonably carry with him, are
.stolen, the company is liable. Lewis v.. Y. Cent. Sleeping-car Co., 359.
SLEEPING-CAR TICKET. See RAILROADS, 11.
SPECIAL DEPOSIT. See BAxms, 1, 28, 29, 31.
SPIRITUAL ADVISER. See UxDuE NLFuLENCE, 1.
STATION. See RAILROADS, 12-14.
STATUTE. See AsslamrNaT FOR CREDITORS, 3. BANKS, 26, 32. CoNSTi-
TUTIONAL LAw, 3, 4, 6. CORPORATION, 4. CRIMINAL LAW, 6. RE-
mOVAL OF (AUSES, 1. STOCKHOLDERS, 1-3. TAXATION, 3.
1. A later general statute may repeal a former by necessary implica-
tion, without express words, but the leaning of the courts is against such
construction. But it is not generally the intention of the legislature to
repeal a local statute, for the benefit of some municipality, by enacting a
general system for the whole state. falloy v. 
Reinlart. 279.
2. Where nothing appears to the contrary in the legislative journals,
it is to be onsidered that all the constitutional requirements have been
complied with in the passage of an act by the general assembly. A torney-
General v. Rice, 299. .
3. The journals of the houses of a legislature are conclusive evidence
of their proceedings, which cannot be contradicted by parol testi-
mony. Id.
4. Courts do not allow parties to agree or admit by pleading that a
statute was not properly or constitutionally passed. Id.
5. If the constitution has not been complied with in the passage of an
act, that fact must be shown by the printed journals, or by the certificate
of the secretary of state, or by the proper custodian of the legislative pro-
ceedings. Id.
6. Unless the journals show affirmatively that the constitutional direc-
tions were not complied with it must be presumed that they were. Id.
7. Courts can take judicial knowledge of the legislativejournals. id.
STOCK. See BAxxs, 32, 33. ConroRATIox, 2, 4, 5, 9. SUSCRI0M'rO,
1-3. TAXATION, 3.
1. Where a corporation is organized under a statute which permits it
to sell stock and provides that stock so sold purporting to be full paid
shall not be liable to future assessments, it may sellat less than paL value
shares of capital stock purporting to be fully paid, and, if there be no
fraud, the creditors of the corporation have no recourse against thepur-
chaser or holder of such stock for the difference between the par value
and the price at which they were sold. Boss v. Silver & Copper Island
3fining Co., 158.
2. The responsibility of a former owner of shares, for an assessment,
ceases upon a sale of the shares and a surrender of the certificates to the
corporation, and the delivery to its president of a power of attorney
sufficient, and intended, to effect, as the president knew, a transfer of
the stock on the books of the bank, although no transfer was actually
made. Whitney v. Butler, 56.
STOCKHOLDERS. See AssociATiOs, 1. CoRPoRATIows, 7. DIVIDENDS, 1.
1. The individual liability of stockholders is a common fund for the
security of creditors and equity will enforce such liability. Qusenan v.
Palmer, 55.
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2. Such liability is not a penalty, but is subject to the demands of de-
positors, etc., as the assets of the bank. Quenan v. Palmer, 55.
3. The words, "to make good all losses," are equivalent to "to make
good all deposits," and mean, "to protect depositors against loss.' Id.
STOLEN PROPERTY. See Coimox OARRIzR, 1-3.
STREET. See DEDICATIox, 2, 3. EmaNENT DOmADN, 2, 3. MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION, 1-5, 10-19. NUmSACE, 1,2.
An owner of an estate abutting on a street, whose fee in the soil ex-
tends to the middle of said street, while the same is subject to the use
of the public for travel, etc., has such property therein as will prevent
the taking of it for the imposition of an additional burden-as its use for
laying and operating a steam railroad-without just compensation being
first made. Florida South. Bd. v. Brown, 279.
SUBSCRIPTIONS. DISCUSSED, 1.
1. A subscriber who recognizes the existence of a corporation by pay-
ing for shares and transferring others, thereby affirms and recognizes his
contract, and is estopped from afterwards denying it. Bell's rppeal, 61.
2. A private agreement that the transferrers shall not be liable on his
stock does not relieve him of liability. Id.
3. Generally a transferee who has come into privity with the company
by the transfer of shares subject to unpaid calls, is liable to contribute his
quota to the trust by making up payments to the full par value of the
stock. -d.
SUBROGATION. See TAE, 1.
SUNDAY. See EVIDENCE, 10, 11.
SURETY. See PRoImssoRY NoTE, 1, 2.
The same person was collector of taxes for three successive years, and
gave bond each year. At the end of the third year a deficit appeared,
but there was no evidence to show when it commenced, or of any appro-
priation of payments. Hedd, the deficit should be divided between the
three bonds, in the proportion of the sums collected on each commitment.
.Phipsburg v. Dickinson, 127.
SURETYSHIP.
A surety on a note has the right, without compulsion, to pay it when
due, and to immediately institute proceedings for his reimbursement, and
a written agreement by a third party to "secure and protect" the surety
"at any time payment must be made," constitute an unconditional con-
tract to secure the surety, whenever the note became payable, whether the
payee demanded it then or not. .Nizno v. Beard, 541.
SURPLUS. See BAxx, 34.
SURPLUS PROFIT. See DrVIDEDS, 1.
TAX. See ADVERSE PossEssroN, 2, 3. BANNs, 32, 33. CoxsrrUoxtA_
LAw, 3, 7. SuRn, 1.
TAXATION. See CHuRcr PROPERTY, 1. REMoVAL or CAUSES, 1.
1. Property in transit from one state to another cannot be taxed as it
passes over any highway, by the state authorities along the line thereof.
Burlington Lumber Co. v. Willetts, 199.
2. Logs put in a bayou for safe keeping until needed have a sufficient
situs to be taxed by the state within whose limits such bayou lies. Id.
3. Under a statute, exempting corporation stock from taxation against
the owner when the capital and property of the corporation are required
to be taxed, the owner of stock in a state bank is not taxable therewith
while the property of the bank is, under the law, taxable, although the
bank does not return its property for taxation, as it should do. Gillespie
v. Gaston, 472.
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4. The main purpose of Congress in fixing limits to state taxation on
investments in shares of national banks was to render it impossible for the
state, in levying such a tax, to create and foster an unequal and unfriendly
competition, by favoring institutions or individuals carrying on a similar
business, and operation and investments of like character. .tercantile
Bank v. N. Y., 473.
TAXES.
1. Taxes are not debts. 'Unless they are expressly, or by plain impli-
cation, authorized to be assigned, legally or equitably, they are incapable of
assignment, and no one can be subrogated to the rights and remedies of
the state. Hinchman v. .1orrLi, 608.
2. A state tax upon the gross receipts of a steamship company, incor-
porated under its laws, which are derived from the transportation of per-
sons and property by sea, between different states and to and from foreign
countries, is a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce, in conflict
with the exclusive power of Congress under the Constitution. .Pita.
Steamship Co. v. Penna., 544.
3. An assessment of a tax upon the shares of shareholders in a corpora-
tion, appearing upon the books of the company, which the company is
required to pay irrespective of any dividends or profits payable to the
shareholders out of which it may repay itself, is a tax upon the corpora-
tion. N Orleans v. Houston, 128.
TEACHER. See ScHooL LAW, 2.
TELEGRAM. See NEGLIGrwcE, 5.
TICKET. See Coimmox CA-RnRIs, 4. RAimOAros, 4, 7, 11.
TIME. See Cox=AcT, 7.
TITLE. See FRAum, 1. MARPIAGE, 5. SALE, 1.
TOLL-GATE. See Tuawr=. Co., 1-3.
TOLLS. See CAuSuE op AcTioN, 5.
TORT. See PLEDGE, 1-4. RiPARiAx RIGnrs, 2.
TRADE-MARK.
Numbers arbitrarily chosen may be taken as a trade-mark, and will be
protected as such. But numbers already in use and known to the trade in.
connection with given styles of goods, cannot be appropriated to his ex-
clusive use by a maker of such styles of goods. American Solid Leather
Battoa Co. v. Anthony, Cowel & C. et al., 173.
TRANSFER OF STOCK. See COnronArOlxS, 5, 6. STOcx 2.
TREATY. See EXTRAD ITI, 1-8.
TRIAL BY COMMITTEE. See UMNCORPORATo D SoCrIrrS, 1-3.
TROVER AND CONVERSION. See BAws, 28.
1. An agreement acknowledging the possession of personal property
claimed by another, and promising to "keep said property free of ex-
pense" to the other, "and to deliver to him on demand such, as I admit
to be," his property, and to keep the balance "until such time as the
question of title is settled," will not prevent such other person from main-
tainingtrorer for the same after demand and refusal. .Buckv.( ich, 122.2. A. and H. each owned a lot of logs of the same kind, quality, and
value, and bearing the same marks. H'. (and another party) contracted
to saw A.'s logs at the same mill where his own were to be manufactured.
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The logs became intermixed without the fault of either party. Held, A.
was entitled to his proportional part of the lumber manufactured from
all the logs, and if H. con rerted to his own use more than his proportional
part of the lumber, he would be liable in trover for the same without a
special demand. Martin v. .Bason, 122.
TRUST. See AT'TORx nrAND CLIENT,4. DEED, 4. FkuD, 1-3. GrrTS
INTER Vivos, 3. IsuR.ANcE (LiFE), 8. MuNicPAL CORPOnA.TIONs, 6,
7. POSSESSION AS Norc, 1, 2. WILL, 6.
1. A trustee for his wife used the funds to build houses on his own
property, and executed a " declaration of trust, that the lots and houses
were held by him under the trust.' The houses were destroyed by fire.
From the material he built a house for his wife and himself, where they
lived until his death, and the widow continued to occupy the house as her
home. A creditor of the husband (who died insolvent) attempted to seize
this house. Held, as the wife had elected to take the property, it was hers.
Brazel v. Fair, 479.
2. Equity will not follow trust funds properly deposited in a bank by a
trustee, when the bank fails, to compel payment in full, if the assets are
insufficient to pay all depositors in full. Fletcher v. Sharpe 71.
3. When deposits are received, unless they are special deposits, they
belong to the b ink as a part of its general funds, and the relation of
debtor and creditor arises between the bank and the depositor. Id.
4. The insurance-money received by a trustee under a mortgage takes
the place of the building, and is security for the debt. Fergus v. Wil-
marth, 63.
5. Such trustee is, as regards the money, the agent of both mortgagor
and mortgagee. The debt not being due, he cannot apply the insurance-
money to its reduction or payment without the debtor's consent, nor give
it to the mortgagor on his promise to use it in rebuilding. Id.
6. Where such trustee deposited the insurance-money, at the mort-
gagor's request, in a bank of good standing, but which afterwards failed,
and did not receive the money as the agent of the creditor, the mortgagor
is not entitled to have such money applied as payment on the mortgage
debt. Id.
7. A. sold land to B., and forwarded the deed to a banker, to be deliv-
ered to B. on payment of $2,000, which was to be immediately remitted
to him. The banker delivered the deed to B. on payment by him of four
$100-bills and certain certificates of deposit, which the banker had pre-
viously issued to him and others. The banker failed the same night, and
before the $2,000 had been remitted to A. Held, that it was a fraud on
A. for the banker to receive certificates instead of cash, and that his assets
in the hands of the assignee were impressed with a trust in favor of A. to
the extknt of $2,000, and that his claim for that amount should be paid
in preference to all other claims. Francis v. Evans, 472.
8. In such case the fact that the creditor has proved his claim and
received a dividend will not affect his right to recover the whole
amount due him less the dividend in an action against the assignee. Id.
9. A wife by deed conveyed property to her husband in trust for her
children, their heirs and assigns forever. The deed authorized the hus-
band "to sell and convey said property as to him seems best, and to re-
invest the money received from the same for the benefit of the said
children." The leed was not to be operative or placed on record during
grantor's lifetime. If the husband survived her, he was "to control and
govern such property the same as if he held the same in fee simple,
without the hinderance or bond to any one." After her death the
husband sold the property for $1,700. and bought other land of H,
plaintiff's intestate, for which he paid $800, and gave a purchase-
money mortgage for $800. Subsequently he borrowed $600 of H., and
gave a second mortgage on same property. His deed from his wife was
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on record. Held, the record being notice to H. and the deed giving
no power to mortgage, the second mortgage was void, but the purchase
having been valid because the price did not exceed the proceeds of the
sale of the land conveyed in the trust deed, it was competent for the
trustee to give a purchase-money mortgage in pursuance of such valid
purchase. Hannah v. Carnahan, 407.
10. Where a trustee gives a valid mortgage on trust property, on the
foreclosure of the mortgage, it is proper to render a personal decree
against him. Id.
11. If a trustee deposits the trust funds in a private bank in which he
is a partner, where the funds will draw interest, upon the request of one
beneficiary and by the consent of the other, he will not be liable for their
loss merely because the bank afterwards failed, the investment being a
safe one when made, and there being no evidence that he, at any time
knew the money was unsafe. A1hi!s v. &vearingen, S36.
12. Trust money which is, for the purpose of investment, loaned to, or
deposited in, a bank to the credit of the trustee as such, is held upon the
the relation of debtor and creditor, is not charged with a trust in the
bank's hands, and upon failure of the bank no preferred claim on
-account of it arises in favor of the cettus que trust. Id.
13. The clause, "I give, bequeath and devise unto Rev. B., of C., all
the rest and residue of my estate, and desire him to use and appropriate
the same for such religious and charitable purposes and objects, and in
such sums and manner as will in his judgment best promote the cause of
Christ," was held just as effective, so far as testator's intention was
concerned, to create a trust as if the proper technical term, "in trust,"
hAd been used. But such trust was void, being too vague and indefinite
to be carried into effect, and property went to heirs-at-law and next of
kin. .faught v. Gezendanner, 2UO.
TRUSTEE. See AGENT, 2. BAwKs, 4,16,17. ComssioNe, 1. HususND
AND WIFE, 1. GuARDLAN AND W.AR, I1. ScHooL L&w, 1. Tns,
4-6, 9, 10.
1. A husband and wife died and left as their sole heir a daughter.
Though there were no debts due the estate, a neighbor and friend of the
parents became administrator for the sole purpose of collecting rents and
receiving possession of certain land. Soon afterwards he procured from
the heir a lease of the land, and before that expired, an extension. Held
that defendant became trustee for the heir, or was estopped from denying
that he was trustee, and that the lease was void as contrary to public
policy, even in the absence of fraud, at the mere will and option of the
beneficiary. Meeker v. Gardella, 408.
2. As defendant bad been trustee for both father and mother, and ad-
minisrator of both, and, as a friend of the family, they and their daugh-
ter had put trust in him, and he had, by virtue of this trust, possession
of this property, and as the daughter was far away, and had no personal
knowledge of her rights, and her correspondence in regard to the property
was solely with him, the relation of trust and confidence continued to the
time of tie extension. Id.
3. In such case fraud, from which a lease would be voidable, will be
presumed. Id.
4. The daughter having conveyed the land to plaintiffs by a warranty
deed, this act avoided her lease. Id.
TRUSTEE PROCESS.
In an action by a married woman against a savings bank for money had
and received, where the answer admits a deposit in plaintiff's name but
claims that part was held and paid under trustee process against plaintill's
husband, and the husband disclaims the fund, and the plaintiff testifies
that the money was her own, the court should not direct a verdict for the
defendant. Townsend v. Webster Say. Bank, 190.
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TURNPIKE COMPANY. See CHARTER, 3.
1. A turnpike company has the right to abandon a toll-gate at a par-
ticular point and erect one at a different point; and although the latter
is set up between one's entrance to his farm and the neighboring town, so
that such person must pay toll, which he was not obliged to do formerly,
he has no action for damages. Maysvile and .Afount Sterling Turnpike
.Road Co. v. iliff, 340.
2. Such company, authorized to acquire land for its road, forty-fivo
feet wide, sixteen of which was to be covered with stone and used fortravel, is not liable for obstructing the iighway by erecting a toll-houseon the land, provided sixteen feet are left for travel. id.
3. Where it is authorized to erect a toll-gate upon the completion offive miles of road, provided none should be sitnated nearer than one mile
from any town, the toll-gates ned not be precisely five miles apart. Id.
ULTRA VIRES. See C0oTrAuCT, 13, 14.
UJNDUJE INFLUENCE. See WILL~s, 2, 3.The rule that a person, who, occupying a confidential r'elation receives
a benefit, has the burden of proving the absence of undue influence, ap-
plies with peculiar force where the beneficiary is the priest, confessor,
clergyman or spiritual adviser of the benefactor, and with no less force
where the parties are a believer in spiritualism and a professed medium.
Conner v. Staneey, 519.
UNAUTHORIZED PAYMENT. See PnnItCrAV aw AGENT, 2.
U NINCORPORATED SOCIETIES.
1. Equity has jurisdiction in causes of action within the control of tri-b*nals ordained by the constitution and by-laws of an unincorporated
society, only where some material irregularity in the proceedings is shownto have occurred which has not been waived by the suitor. Appeal of
,Spery, 472.
2. An irregularity in the appointmant of a committee to try is waivedby the appearance of the accused, if having knowledge of the irregularity
he does not object. Id.3. The exclusion of a competent witness on the ground of his incom-
peteny, is an error of judgment, not an irregularity of procedure. Id.
UNJUST DISCRIMINATION. See C0'STITUT0NA LAw, 6.
UNPAID CALLS. See SunscRnWirO, 1-3.
USURY.A promissory note given for a balance due on previous notes which
were usurious is tainted with e usury; but a note given for money to be
applied in payment of other notes which were usurious, is not itself usur-
iouser . ley Souwi, 337.
VARIANCE. See EVAYEN 22.
VENDOR AND VENDEE. See ADVERSE .Posssso 1. IhSUEAWE
(FinE), 2-4. SALE, 3.1. Apurchaser of land is conclusively presumed to have notice of all
equities of persons, other than his vendor, in possession of the premises,
63.2. A purchaser of land, while part of the price remained unpaid and
befor he tcrlegal title was conveyed to him, conveyed a part to A. After
purchaser's death, all his interest therein was sold by order of the Pro-
bate Court to B., who knew of his claim, but paid the original vendor the
balance due in purchase price, and obtained a deed to the whole tract.
-Rdd. A. was entitled to a conveyance of his part from B., upon paying a
ratable proportion of the sum paid by hmn . iltos v. Young, 680.
VESTED INTEREST. See WisTs, 7,8.
INDEX.
VESTED RIGHTS. See LMTATIONS, STATUTE OF, 1.
VICE PRINCIPAL. See MASTER AxD SERVA-T, 3.
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS. See CONTRACTS, 2,12.
VOTLNG. See EviEzNc, 9.
WAGERS. See GAmBLInG, L
WAIVER. See CON-zTRACT, 7. IwsuapwcE (LIFE), 12, 14. PRoMORY
NOTE, 4. RAILROADS, 7-10. UNINCORPORATED SOCIETIES, 1-3.
WARRANTY. See INSURANCE (FRE), 1. IxsunAwczc (LIPE), 11, 13.
WAREHOUSEMEN. See Coarsrox CARRIERS, 9.
WASTE. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 3.
1. A tenant under a lease for perpetual renewal will be restrained from
tearing down and removing a dwelling house, if such removal would
greatly impair and endanger the security for the rent, but if the rent is
not endangered, he may tear down, etc., as he pleases. Crowe v. Vil-
son, 61.
2. Where one sells land, taking a mortgage for all the purchase-money,
and the understanding is that the tract is to be sold for building-lots, the
vendee will not be allowed to open quarries and sell the contents to the
prejudice of the security of the mortgage. .Martin's Appeal, 479.
WATER RIGHTS. See WATERS AND WATER-COURSES, 5, 6.
WATERS AND WATER-COURSES. See BoumDns, 3. DEDICATION,
2,3. RIPARIAN R IGHTS, 1, 3,4.
1. Where a railway company diverts the flow of surface water from its
natural channel and conducts it through a ditch it has made along its
right of way and empties it into a slough at a point where it overflows the
land of another, the company may be liable for such damage as result
from its own act, but not on account of any water that may be brought
into such railroad ditch by artificial drains of other parties, made without
the sanction of the company. Chicago and Alton Rd. v. Glenney, 199.
2. The provision in the ordinance of 1787 that the navigable waters
leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence shall be common highways,
forever free, without tax, etc., refers to rivers in their natural state and
does not prohibit a state from improving the navigation of such waters
within her limits, or charging tolls from vessels using such improvements.
H use v. Glorer, 192.
3. The existence of bridges, dams, etc., does not change the character
of such river as a highway. Id.
4. A "duty of tonnage" within the meaning of the constitution is a
charge upon a vessel, according to its tonnage, as an instrument of com-
merce, for entering or leaving a port, or navigating the public waters of
the country. Id.
5. One having sold and conveyed land with a spring upon it, the grantee
engaged to convey "the water from the spring at the foot of the hill, by
a pipe under the bed of the railroad to the south line of said road, so as
to be accessible for watering stock on that part of grantor's farm; but the
grantee by quarrying for stone sapped the source of supply of the spring,
destroying the former site and causing it to spring up in a different spot.
.Hfeld, grantee was not bound to maintain the spring in the exact spot
where it first existed, and if the water was as well supplied from another
spot he had not violated his contract. Chamberlain v. B. & 0. By., 344.
6. The measure of damages would be the loss to 'the grantor from the
change of location in not having a supply of water for his stock, and not
the value of the water for all purposes as affecting the value of the farm
Id.
7. Land covered by navigable water is not the subject of entry and
grant. Hodges v. Williams, 280.
INDEX.
WATERS AND WATER-COURSES.
8. The test in North Carolina whether water is navigable is, is it so for
sea vessels? Hodges v. Wiliams, 280.
9. A water way lying wholly within a state, and not connected with
other waters leading to the sea, is not navigable under the laws of the
U.S. Id.
10. The ripraian owner of land bordering on a river, technically not
navigable, owns to the middle of the stream subject to the easement of
use. Id.
11. But he has no title adfiluas aquo; if the state has granted the bed
of the stream to another. ld..
12. Under such circumstances the riparian owner is not entitled to
land made by a withdrawal of the waters. Id.
13. Where land is left by a sudden withdrawal of navigable waters, it
belongs to the sovereign; but where this is done by a gradual withdrawal,
it belongs to the riparian owner. Id.
WAY. See EASEmENT, 1.
WILL. See CosTs, 1. LEGAcY, 1. PowER OF SALE, 1, 2. TItusTs, 13.
WITESSES, 1.
1. One in contemplation of a journey, signed a paper, beginning, "I am
going to town with my drill and i aint feeling good and in case if i
shouldn't get back, do as i say on this paper." He went to town, became
very ill, returned home and died soon afterwards. Held, the paper could
not be admitted to probate. 3forrou's Apeal, 544.
2. Where a will is written by a stranger, who is the principal benefi-
ciary, he must prove that testatrix was fully acquainted with its contents,
and, therefore, he can begin and conclude the argument. Blaa v. Hart-
man etat., 64.
3. Where a will is written by a son, and there is strong evidence that
it was not read or explained to the testatrix, it is not error for the court
to instruct the jury that the burden is upon the son to prove that it was
properly made in accordance with testatrix's instructions. Id.
4. The validity of a devise is governed by the law of the place where
the land is situated, and this includes not only the form and mode of exe-
cution of the will, but also the lawful power and authority of the testator
to make such disposition. Ford v. Ford, 539.
5. The validity of a bequest is governed by the law of testator's domi-
cile. Id.
6. A will provided, "I give and devise to my nephew, D., and his heirs
all my effects, estate, both real and personal, excepting support of my
sister ff. during her lifetime; and I give my estate in trust to my execu-
tor. * * * I give to H., my sister, her support during her natural
lifetime out of my estate!' Held, to be a gift of the whole estate to the
executor in trust for the life support of H., and the remainder after the
termination of the trust to D. Barnes v. Dow, 608.
7. In a will devising both real and personal estate, the clause, "if there
is any money remaining after my death, it shall be equally divided, etc.,"
was held to intend not only actual cash, but also all the other personal
estate, consisting chiefly of money loaned. Decker v. Decker, 608.
8. Testator directed all his estate to be sold and converted into money,
and devised to each of the four children of his sister, P. (naming them),
one share, and to her two grandchildren each a half share, and in case of
the death of either of said four children, then to the widow of such de-
ceased, and in like manner one share to each of the children (naming
them), of his brothers and another sister, and three shares to his half-
brother, and directed that "in the event of the death of any one named
above, then the share of the deceased to be paid to his offspring, and if
none," his part to lapse. Thirteen days after testator's death a son of P.
died, leaving children, and his administrator claimed his share. Hedd,
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such son did not take a vested interet immediately upon testator's death,
and the share of such son went to his heirs. Banta v. Boyd, 128.
9. The persons named took no vested interest before the arrival of the
time for distribution. In case of the death of any before that time, his
share went to his children, and if none, lapsed. I.
10. Where a statute provides that a noncupative will must be made
at the time of the last "sickness" of testator, it was held that 'last sick-
ness" meant "in extremis." and that such will. made during a last illness,
nine days before the death, cannot be probated where the proof is clear
that testator had time and capacity to subsequently make a written will,
if he so desired. Carroll v. Bonhan, 568.
WITNESSES. See BAwXs, 30. CR TANAL LAw, 23. EVIDENcE, 6, 8, 20,
21. RAILROAT COM ISSIoN, 1, 2.
1. An executor, who is also a legatee, who has released his legacy, is
competent to prove the will, and to testify to conversations and trans-
actions of the testator about its preparation. I re Will of Wilsun, 64.
2. A divorced wife cannot testify to confidential communications between
her and her husband, made during the marriage. Brock v. Brock, 480.
3. If a witness has made to a party who calls him, or his attorney, a
statement totally variant from his sworn testimony, on the faith of which
statement lie has been called, he may be asked if lie made such a state-
ment, and if he denies it he may, for the protection of the party, be im-
peached so far as such statement is concerned. Smith v. Briscoe, 194.
4. An expert may testify to the value of property, although he has
not seen it for a month prior to the time when the value was to be estab-
lished, if other testimony shows that the property was in substantially
the same condition at both times. Connolly v. Miller, 805.
WORKS OF NECESSITY. See Bv'DixCF 10, 11.
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